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FROM PUBLIC CHARITY TO SOCIAL JUSTICE:




"A fella got to eat," he began; and then,
belligerently, "A fella got a right to eat."
"What fella?" Ma asked.'
I. INTRODUCTION
In January of 1964, President Lyndon B. Johnson declared an "un-
conditional war on poverty."2 President Johnson asked Congress to en-
act a thirteen point program designed to eliminate the "domestic enemy
which threaten[ed] the strength of our Nation and the welfare of our
people."3 Sargent Shriver, Director of the Office of Economic Opportu-
nity,4 indicated that by 1985, the federal government would have waged
and won the war against poverty.5
However, in 1984,6 the national poverty rate was at its third highest
level since 1965, the year after the government began its fight.7 Accord-
ing to the Census Bureau Report, 14.4% of the nation lived below the
poverty line.8 Roughly thirty-four million Americans were described as
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1. J. STEINBECK, THE GRAPES OF WRATH 414 (1939).
2. W. TRATTNER, FROM POOR LAW TO WELFARE STATE 301 (3d ed. 1984).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. See Roderick, Seattle Women Get New Start - Then it Ended; Case History of a 20 -
Year War on Poverty, L.A. Times, July 31, 1985, at 21, col. 2.
6. The statistics for 1984 were the most recent available at the time this Article was
written.
7. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL AB-
STRACTS OF THE UNITED STATES, CHART No. 766, at 457 (1986).
8. Id. The United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, defines vari-
ous levels of poverty as follows: an individual earning less than $5,400 per year falls below the
poverty line; a couple that earns less than $6,983 is considered to be below the poverty level;
and a family of four is considered to be below the poverty line if its gross income is less than
$10,609 per year. Id. at 430.
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being impoverished. 9 One out of every seven Americans was poor.' 0
Eighteen years after President Johnson declared his war on poverty,
President Reagan, in his 1982 State of the Union Address, sounded the
retreat.II Under President Reagan's new federalism plan, states will as-
sume the problems and responsibilities of caring for the poor.
12
In light of the federal government's withdrawal,' 3 how each state
chooses to care for its poor has become increasingly important. ' 4 In Cal-
ifornia, every county resident who has no income, no savings or re-
sources and receives no financial support from family or friends has the
statutory right to general relief. How this right is defined affects the lives
of almost 67,000 Californians.15
9. Id. at 457, Chart No. 766.
10. Id. at 26.
11. Support for Reagan's decision to retreat can be found in C. MURRAY, LOSING
GROUND: AMERICAN SOCIAL POLICY 1950 - 1980 (1984). But see Mattison, Stop Making
Sense: Charles Murray and the Reagan Perspective on Social Welfare Policy and the Poor, 4
YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 90 (1985).
12. Under Reagan's new federalism plan, by 1987 the states would have to assume the
entire cost for 43 social programs including Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)
and food stamps. Under the plan, state and local governments would have the option to re-
duce or abandon any or all of the programs. W. TRATTNER, supra note 2, at 333; see also, F.
PIVEN & R. CLOWARD, THE NEW CLASS WAR 125-34 (1982), Although much of Reagan's
new federalism plan was not adopted by Congress, by 1985 between 400,000-500,000 families
were cut from AFDC and an additional 300,000 families had their checks reduced. Meyer &
Bearak, Poverty: Toll Grows Amid Aid Cutbacks, L.A. Times, July 28, 1985, at 7, col. 3.
13. The House of Representatives, reacting to both the federal government's retreat and
the increasing numbers of homeless people, passed a $725,000,000 aid package for the nation's
homeless. Mills, Cost Complaints Fail to Stop S725-Million Package; House Approves More Aid
to Homeless, L.A. Times, Mar. 6, 1987, § I, at 17, col. 1. Congressman Foley, t he Democratic
Majority Leader from Washington, stated "[n]obody in this country should have to go without
food and shelter. This bill recognizes that priority." Id. The White House reacted by saying
that the measure was "costly and duplicative." Id. Claiming that the federal government has
spent $260,000,000 in fiscal 1987, the White House stated that "the rest of the burden should
be carried by the state and local governments." Id.
14. Every state and the District of Columbia has a general assistance program. General
assistance programs, whether they are called general relief, emergency relief, home relief, or
county relief, all have one thing in common-they are the benefit programs of last resort.
They are the largest non-federal welfare programs in the United States. They provide financial
assistance to those persons who are ineligible for federal/state categorical assistance programs
such as AFDC or Social Security Insurance (SSI).
The structure of the state programs, however, differs. Nineteen states and the District of
Columbia administer their programs directly. Nine states supervise county administered pro-
grams which are state-county funded. Twenty-two states, including California, have locally
administered programs with little or no state supervision. HEW, SSA/Office of Family Assist-
ance, Characteristics of General Assistance in the United States, HEW Pub. No. (SSA)
78-21239 (1978).
15. The latest available statistics show that in the 58 California counties, a total of 66,844
people received general relief in 1985. DATA PROCESSING & STATISTICAL SERVS. BUREAU,
STATE OF CALIFORNIA, HEALTH & WELFARE AGENCY DEP'T OF SOCIAL SERVS., PA3-315,
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This Article will examine the court's role in determining the scope
and quality of the right to general relief. The first part of the Article will
discuss the statutory framework, purpose and structural flaws of Califor-
nia's general relief program. Part II will examine how the courts' differ-
ent roles have affected the substantive quality of the right to general
relief. Finally, in Part III, the Article argues that the courts should as-
sume an active role in reviewing county welfare regulations to ensure
they adequately relieve and support the poor.
II. THE STATUTORY RIGHT
Under the United States Constitution, no one has the fundamental
right to welfare.I6 No one has the constitutional right to food, shelter or
clothing. 7 The Supreme Court has stated:
[T]he intractable economic, social, and even philosophical
problems presented by public welfare assistance programs are
not the business of this Court .... the Constitution does not
empower this Court to second-guess state officials charged with
the difficult responsibility of allocating limited public welfare
funds among the myriad of potential recipients."8
Welfare assistance programs, however, are the business of the Cali-
fornia courts. While no right to relief from poverty exists under the
United States' Constitution, every county in California has a statutory
duty to relieve and support its poor. 19
Since 1855 there has been some form of county general assistance in
California.2" But not until 1937 did the California legislature create the
Welfare and Institutions Code.2' In 1965, the legislature adopted the
PUBLIC WELFARE IN CALIFORNIA, TABLE 9 (Dec. 1985) [hereinafter PUBLIC WELFARE IN
CALIFORNIA].
The characteristics of people on skid row today differ from those of the past. For exam-
ple, in Los Angeles, a study conducted by the Community Redevelopment Agency showed
that over half of the residents on skid row finished high school. Clifford & McMillan, Home-
less Tally Overstated for L.A., Study Says, L.A. Times, Feb. 8, 1987, § I, at 30, col. 1. Almost
20% attended college. Id. Persons on skid row are younger than their predecessors, and a
greater number of women inhabit the streets than ever before. Id. These statistics indicate
that a new strata of society is living on skid row. The right to general relief, therefore, if it is to
mean anything at all, must correlate to the needs of persons presently on skid row rather than
to the needs of persons who lived on skid row 20 years ago.
16. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
17. Id.
18. Id. at 487.
19. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 17000-17009 (West 1980).
20. Mooney v. Pickett, 4 Cal. 3d 669, 677, 483 P.2d 1231, 1236, 94 Cal. Rptr. 279, 284
(1971).
21. Id. at 677-78, 483 P.2d at 1236, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 284.
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present general relief statutes.22 Welfare and Institutions Code sections
17000-17009 describe the functioning structure of the program. 23 Sec-
tion 17000 provides:
Every county and every city and county shall relieve and sup-
port all incompetent, poor, indigent persons, and those incapac-
itated by age, disease, or accident, lawfully resident therein,
when such persons are not supported and relieved by their rela-
tives or friends, by their own means, or by state hospitals or
other state or private institutions.24
Under section 17000, a county has no discretion whether to relieve and
support its poor. Section 17000 mandates that each county aid its incom-
petent, poor and indigent.
Two depression era cases support this construction of section
17000.25 In 1932, "due to world-wide economic conditions," an esti-
mated 40,000 to 60,000 families needed assistance in the City and County
of San Francisco.26 The board of supervisors, lacking sufficient revenue
to support so many people, placed a bond issue on the ballot in an effort
to raise the needed revenue.27 The registrar of voters refused to place the
bond issue on the ballot, claiming that the board lacked the authority to
issue that type of a bond.28 The California Supreme Court in City of San
Francisco v. Collins, interpreting the Pauper Act of 1931, which is virtu-
ally identical to the 1965 draft of California's general relief statutes, held
that the city and county had a mandatory duty to relieve its poor, and
thus had the authority to place the bond issue on the ballot.29
Five years later, in County of Los Angeles v. Payne,3" the Board of
Supervisors of the County of Los Angeles declared that "a grave public
emergency existed" in Los Angeles when approximately 75,000 persons
were destitute and indigent. 31 The board of supervisors, having already
expended all the funds previously budgeted for poor relief, appropriated
an additional $1,000,000 for "the purpose of furnishing direct relief to
the poor, destitute, indigent and infirm persons of the County .... 32
22. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 17000-17009.
23. Id.
24. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 17000 (West 1980).
25. County of Los Angeles v. Payne, 8 Cal. 2d 563, 66 P.2d 658 (1937); City of San Fran-
cisco v. Collins, 216 Cal. 187, 13 P.2d 912 (1932).
26. Collins, 216 Cal. at 189, 13 P.2d at 913.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 190, 13 P.2d at 913.
30. 8 Cal. 2d 563, 66 P.2d 658.
31. Id. at 566-67, 66 P.2d at 659-60.
32. Id. at 566, 66 P.2d at 660.
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The auditor and treasurer of the county, however, refused to approve the
requisition of funds, claiming that, among other things, "the cost and
expense of furnishing such relief to indigent persons . . . is not a
'mandatory expenditure required by law' . . . ."" The California
Supreme Court, relying on City of San Francisco v. Collins,34 flatly re-
jected the treasurer and auditor's claim. The court reasoned that "the
expenditures provided in said resolution are mandatory expenditures re-
quired by law ... 
In neither case, however, did the court inquire if the amount of
money to be raised was sufficient to actually provide relief and support to
the poor. This determination and the appropriate manner of implemen-
tation were left to the discretion of the counties.36
Deference to the counties' discretion in administering their pro-
grams is supported by the statutory framework of county assistance.
Welfare and Institutions Code section 17001 provides: "The board of
supervisors of each county, or the agency authorized by county charter,
shall adopt standards of aid and care for the indigent and dependent poor
of the county or city and county."' 37 The statute does not indicate what
form or content those standards should take. Rather, the statute leaves
to the discretion of the counties the kind and amount of aid they should
allocate.
The 1965 legislature also allowed each county to decide whether to
establish almshouses and county farms to care for the poor.38 Welfare
and Institutions Code section 17200 provides that "[w]ork may be re-
quired of an indigent ... as a condition of relief."39 Such programs are
commonly referred to as workfare projects.
That every county must provide general relief and that each county
has the discretion to administer its own programs is to recognize only the
mechanical framework of the statutory program. The codes also require
that the counties administer their programs humanely, with the purpose
of engendering self-reliance and self-respect.40 For example, California
Welfare and Institutions Code section 10000 expresses the statutory pur-
pose and legislative intent of division nine (sections 10000-18971) which
33. Id. at 568, 66 P.2d at 661.
34. 216 Cal. 187, 13 P.2d 912.
35. Payne, 8 Cal. 2d at 573, 66 P.2d at 663.
36. Collins, 216 Cal. at 190, 13 P.2d at 913; Payne, 8 Cal. 2d at 573, 66 P.2d at 664.
37. CAL.. WEll:. & INST. COIE § 17001.
38. Id. § 17002.
39. CAL. WEL:. & INST. CODE § 17200 (West 1980 & Supp. 1987).
40. CAl.. WELl. & INST. Coi)i: § 10000 (West 1980).
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contains the provisions governing the general relief program (sections
17000-17410). Section 10000 provides:
The purpose of this division is to provide for protection, care,
and assistance to the people of the state in need thereof, and to
promote the welfare and happiness of all the people of the state
by providing appropriate aid and services to all of its needy and
distressed. It is the legislative intent that aid shall be adminis-
tered and services provided promptly and humanely ... and
that aid shall be so administered and services so provided.., as
to encourage self-respect, self-reliance, and the desire to be a
good citizen, useful to society.4
Section 17111 mandates that an applicant or recipient "be permitted
to retain, without effect on his eligibility for aid or the amount of aid to
which he is otherwise entitled, the tools of his trade necessary to continue
or seek employment ... in order to enable the applicant or recipient to
become self-supporting."42 Furthermore, the statutes indicate that
workfare projects, if adopted by the counties, "shall be created for the
purpose of keeping the indigent from idleness and assisting in his or her
rehabilitation and the preservation of his or her self-respect.
' '43
Two separate goals can be identified within the authorizing language
of the general relief statutes. First, that each county relieve and support
its poor in a humane and decent manner mindful of the desire to en-
courage self-respect and self-reliance. And, second, that a county, which
requires workfare projects of its able-bodied, employable poor, provide
them with an opportunity to revolve out of poverty and to become self-
supporting members of society.
Implicit in these two goals is the acknowledgement of two classes of
general relief recipients. The first is the unemployable, disabled poor.
This class is comprised of the very young, the old, the disabled and men-
tally incompetent.' These persons, since feudal times in England, have
been considered the deserving poor, worthy of society's care.45 The sec-
ond class of recipients is the able-bodied, but unemployed. These persons
historically have been perceived as the "undeserving," the poor who are
on the dole.46 Since the great depression, however, the reality of the de-
41. Id..
42. Id. § 17111.
43. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 17200.
44. W. TRATTNER, supra note 2, at 8-10.
45. Id.
46. As Governor of California in 1967, Ronald Reagan said "[w]e are not going to perpet-
uate poverty by substituting a permanent dole for a paycheck." Id. at 307.
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serving, able-bodied poor has been recognized.47 This group is com-
prised of the poor, who through no fault of their own, are unable to find
work or cannot maintain a job. The identifiable goals of the general relief
statutes are to adequately care for the needs of both of these classes. The
adoption of the general relief statutes is, therefore, a public recognition of
the desire and the duty to care for the needs of those who cannot care for
themselves. The statutes contemplate the evolution of public welfare
from a privilege to a right, from a notion of public charity to dedication
to social justice.48
The right to general relief should be interpreted to promote these
purposes. Aid should be provided to the needy for their "protection,
care and assistance." 49 Appropriate aid and care should be provided to
the needy to encourage self-respect and self-reliance.
But what are appropriate standards of aid and care? What does it
mean to "relieve and support" the poor, and who has the authority to
make these decisions? According to the statutes, the board of supervi-
sors of each county has the duty to adopt standards of aid and care.50
Inherent in this duty is the authority to interpret and define the substan-
tive quality (the assistance levels) and the scope (the eligibility standards)
of the statutory right to general relief.
There is no legislative history, or record, however, to guide counties
or courts in determining county obligations under or the substantive
meaning of the general relief statutes. The statutes do not instruct the
counties how to implement or administer their programs. Nor do the
statutes indicate what the proper role of the court should be in reviewing
general relief programs. The legislature's intent must be taken from the
plain meaning of the statutes themselves.
47. For example, Ms. Jill Halverson, director of the Downtown Women's Center, a Los
Angeles residence for homeless women, has observed that the able-bodied unemployables:
'are the hardest group for the general public to care about because they appear to be
able-bodied, and they do not seem maimed in the sense that they are not visibly
mentally ill or hopelessly alcoholic.'
'But they are maimed . . . in that they are the laborers, farmhands and factory
workers trained for a world-that no longer exists, and they lack the know-how or the
motivation for retraining.'
Clifford, A Wide-Open Alternative For Homeless. L.A. Times, Mar. 10, 1987, § II (Metro), at 1.
col. 2-4. For further discussion of the economic causes and dilemmas of the able-bodied unem-
ployed see Mattison, supra note 11, at 93.
48. See Robbins v. Superior Court. 38 Cal. 3d 199, 209, 695 P.2d 695, 701, 211 Cal. Rptr.
398, 404 (1985).
49. CAt.. Wru.F. & INST. CouF § 10000.
50. CAL. WE-.I.[:. & INST. CODE § 17001 (West 1980).
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The statutes make it the counties' legal duty to adopt "standards of
aid and care" which will "relieve and support" their poor. Does this
statutory language require that the counties actually feed, clothe and
house their poor in a style suitable to the middle class? Or can the coun-
ties provide so little care that aid becomes meaningless? An analysis of
the plain meaning of the statutes manifests the legislature's intent that
the counties adequately relieve and support the minimum subsistence
needs of their poor.
The legislature intended the terms "relieve" and "support" to have
meaning. Therefore, the legislature must have intended the counties to
provide some assistance. The question, then, is how much and to whom.
In the absence of legislative guidance, we must look to the common us-
age of the statutory terms employed to determine legislative intent.
Webster's Dictionary defines the terms "relieve" and "support" as
follows: "[r]elieve: to free from a burden, evil, pain or distress: give
ease, comfort, or consolation ... to bring about the removal or allevia-
tion of... ;51 [s]upport: to uphold by aid, countenance or adherence:
actively promote the interests or cause of .... ,1 Read in conjunction
with the aspirational goals of section 10000, usage of these terms indi-
cates that the counties' duty to aid the poor requires them to adequately
aid and care for the poor. To relieve the poor from their distress, home-
lessness, and hunger requires that the counties provide adequate care.
To provide less than adequate care would result in continued suffering,
homelessness and distress. If a county had discretion to provide less than
adequate care, the welfare statutes would be impotent.
Assuming the legislature intended the counties to provide adequate
care for the poor, such care, would have to include enough aid to provide
for minimum subsistence needs. The most basic needs of the poor have
been recognized to include food, shelter, utilities, clothing, medical care,
and transportation. 3 Providing care for these needs is the statutory min-
imum; it is the least that a county must do to fulfill its legal obligation. A
county may raise its general relief grant to provide more aid, but a
county may not provide less care than necessary.
The counties, however, argue that because the legislature authorized
them to administer their own general relief programs, the legislature im-
plicitly allowed them to consider their'needs over those of the poor. But
it does not stand to reason that the legislature allocated such discretion
51. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAl. DICTIONARY 1918 (1976).
52. Id. at 2297.
53. See Boehm v. Superior Court, 178 Cal. App. 3d 494, 503, 223 Cal. Rptr. 716, 722
(1986).
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to the counties so the board of supervisors could circumvent the purposes
of the statutes and provide less than adequate care. By delegating such
authority to county boards of supervisors, the state legislators intended
the counties to exercise their discretion consistently with the statutes'
purpose.
Furthermore, the fact that the legislature chose a county run pro-
gram instead of a state controlled program does not mean the legislature
intended the counties to act independently of statutory purposes or the
state's interests. Rather, the counties were to act as the agents of the
state,54 completing another link in the overall welfare safety net. The
state legislators most likely believed the adoption of county run programs
would be more effective and efficient than would state run bureaus. The-
oretically, each county would be able to assess the needs of its poor better
than a centralized bureau. Each county would therefore be better able to
tailor its program to adequately meet the needs of its poor.
In addition, the 1965 legislature may have believed that with the
birth of the Great Society and civil right's movement, a county board of
supervisors would be more aware of the needs of the community's indi-
gents, and thus, more responsive to the indigents' needs than a central-
ized bureau. Under any conceivable rationale, the state legislature left
the statutory terms, "aid" and "care," "relieve" and "support," open-
ended, so counties could effectively and efficiently meet the needs of its
poor, rather than insulate themselves and avoid their statutory duties.
In reality, the lack of any guidelines and definitions has permitted
each county to adopt its own interpretation of the statutes' meaning.
This has led to many unintended consequences. Counties have inter-
preted the meaning of "relieve" and "support" in such a way as to ob-
scure the goals of the general relief program. For example, because it is
each county's duty to adopt standards of relief and support, counties
have attempted to exclude from relief young persons who are employable
but temporarily unemployed." In addition, counties exercising their dis-
cretion to determine what is adequate care, have attempted to allocate
$83 per month to the poor when all relevant indicators show that a mini-
mum of $143 is necessary to provide for their most basic needs. 56 In
such cases, counties contend that they are acting within their statutory
authority to define the meaning of "relieve" and "support." However,
the counties have been oblivious to the plain language of the statutes and
the goals of the general relief program.
54. See Mooney, 4 Cal. 3d at 679, 483 P.2d at 1237, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 285.
55. See id. at 671, 483 P.2d at 1232, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 280.
56. See City of San Francisco, 57 Cal. App. 3d at 48-49, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 715-16.
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The practical difficulties of a county run general relief program stem
from the fact that a county board of supervisors' acts are not reviewed by
any state agency, administrative body or committee. They are not ac-
countable to any state office; they need only listen to their own constitu-
ents. As a result, each county sees itself as an autonomous entity, free to
run its program as it chooses and free to ignore the mandatory duty the
statutes impose. One example of this occurred in Del Norte County. By
1932 it was clear that the counties had a mandatory duty to support the
poor. Yet, as of 1980, Del Norte County, had for all practical purposes
no general relief program." And "[u]ntil 1981, Placer County denied
relief to employable persons who did not participate in a county work
program. However, no county work program was in existence. There-
fore, no employable person could qualify under the program
requirements."58
County run general relief programs have the additional shortcoming
of being susceptible to political pressures. The county board of supervi-
sors are elected officials. Their determinations regarding county social
services are thus constrained by budgetary concerns. Faced with limited
budgets, supervisors must inevitably balance the needs of the poor
against the needs of other persons and programs in the county.
The problem is that general relief recipients have no political influ-
ence. General relief recipients are the poorest of the poor; they are the
homeless and helpless. They are the least likely of any in society to assert
their rights because they are the least likely to know them. In addition,
county supervisors perceive a portion of the general relief population as
undeserving poor who are taking advantage of the system and not enti-
tled to aid. A combination of these factors places the right to general
relief at the bottom of supervisors' budgetary priorities. For example,
the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors failed to raise the general
relief grant level during the five year period from 1981 to 1986.1'
But the right to general relief for roughly 77,000 Californians is
their only source of aid.6" Without it, they would have no access to shel-
ter and no source of food. They would be completely destitute. By plac-
ing the right to general relief in the hands of the board of supervisors,
57. See Comment, General Assistance in California, 12 SAN FERN. V.L. REv. 31. 35
(1984).
58. Id. at 32 n.5.
59. See Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Motion for
Summary Judgment and Motion for Summary Adjudication of Issues at 3, Blair v. Board of
Supervisors (No. C568184) (L.A. Super. Ct. filed Jan. 9. 1987) (settled before trial) [hereinafter
Blair Memorandum].
60. PUBLIC WELFARE IN CALIFORNIA, supra note 15, at table 9.
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there is the risk that a minority, those who have the least, both finan-
cially and politically, will be homeless and hungry due to the political
pressures for limited county funds.
As a result of each county's insularity and independence from each
other, there are grave inadequacies in the general relief program. For
example, there are 31,300-33,800 homeless people in Los Angeles County
alone.6 A frightening example of the reality of the program's inadequa-
cies is that during the week of January 12, 1987, four persons died on the
streets of Los Angeles from exposure and hypothermia.62
The most common problem faced throughout the state is inadequate
benefit levels. Of the fifty-eight counties in California, five provide less
than $50 a month.6 3 Eight provide between $50-$100.64 Thirty-two
counties provide between $100-$200 a month.6 5 Thirteen counties pro-
vide more than $200 a month.6 6 When statistics demonstrate that hous-
ing is unavailable for less than $190 a month in Los Angeles County,
providing monthly benefits of $228 cannot possibly meet the most basic
needs of the poor.6 7 In order for a person to stay off the streets, benefit
levels must be sufficient to permit a person to afford housing as well as
groceries, clothes, transportation, medical care and personal hygienics.
Inadequacies also exist in the procedural due process safeguards
available to general relief applicants and recipients. In 1979, applicants
and recipients became entitled to procedural due process before benefits
could be denied or terminated.68 In reality, the process is most often
non-existent or at best minimal.69 In Los Angeles County, out of the
roughly 2,000 hearing notices sent out each month, less than 100 hear-
ings are provided. This is in large part due to notices being sent to old or
unused addresses. Because the applicant/recipient receives aid sufficient
61. OFFICE OF POLICY DEVELOPMENT & RESEARCH, U.S. DEP'T OF HOUSING & URBAN
DEVELOPMENT, A REPORT TO THE SECRETARY ON THE HOMELESS AND EMERGENCY SHEL-
TERS 14 (1984) [hereinafter REPORT TO THE SECRETARY].
62. Simon & Himmel, L.A. Opens City Hall as Shelter for Homeless, L.A. Times, Jan. 21.
1987, § 1, at 16, col. 3. One died on the street outside a Chinese restaurant in Chinatown. It
was 36 degrees that night. Another huddled for warmth in a car tire and froze during the
night. A third died wrapped in blankets in the Hansen Dam Park. The fourth was found
alone in a park. His body temperature had fallen below 60 degrees.




67. See Blair Memorandum, supra note 59 at 35.
68. See Griffeth v. Detrich, 603 F.2d 118, 119 (9th Cir. 1979).
69. It is beyond the scope of this Article to discuss the inadequacy of the procedural due
process being afforded to general relief recipients. It is enough for the limited purposes of this
Article to recognize that the inadequacy exists, and hope it will be reviewed and remedied.
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to remain in an apartment only for a portion of the month, the appli-
cant/recipient is forced to live on the street for the remainder of the
month. Notices informing the applicant/recipient of his or her hearing
date or benefit termination arrive at a location no longer being used. The
hearing date passes, and the applicant/recipient's benefits are termi-
nated/denied without review. This procedural due process flaw is exac-
erbated by Los Angeles County's fixed address requirement which denies
applicants/recipients the ability to use homeless shelters as mailing ad-
dresses. The homeless person on the street never learns of his or her
hearing, and the right to procedural due process remains an empty proce-
dural protection.
Various other inadequacies and improprieties have been reported.
They include the use of inaccessible resources in the eligibility computa-
tion to disqualify applicants;7" the unavailibility of emergency housing
for applicants and recipients;7' residency requirements which effectively
exclude the homeless from relief;72 strenuous application procedures
and administrative meeting requirements which preclude the mentally
ill/homeless from receiving relief;73 punitive workfare penalties which
serve to exclude recipients from relief for extended periods of time.74
The only place to challenge the inadequacies of a county's general
relief program is in the courts. How the court perceives its role in defin-
ing the statutory right to general relief impacts directly upon the lives of
the most desperate and powerless in our society. If the court defers to
the discretion of the county board of supervisors concerning the adminis-
tration of general relief, then the substantive quality of the right to gen-
eral relief may be narrowed. If the courts engage too far into the practice
of defining the scope and quality of the right to relief, then the courts
may overstep their authority and tread into areas left to the discretion of
the county. The next section will examine the different roles the courts
have played in California's general relief system.
III. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Since early in the nation's history, the judiciary has been the final
interpreter of the law. In Marbury v. Madison,75 Chief Justice John Mar-
70. See Comment, supra note 57, at 37.
71. Id.
72. Id.; but see Nelson v. Board of Supervisors. 190 Cal. App. 3d 25, 235 Cal. Rptr. 305
(1987).
73. For a discussion of Rensch v. County of Los Angeles, see infra text accompanying notes
310-24.
74. For a discussion of the 60-day penalty see infra text and accompanying notes 329-34.
75. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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shall proclaimed that "it is emphatically the province and duty of the
judicial department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to
particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule."76
More recently the California Supreme Court stated:
"While the construction of a statute by officials charged with its
administration, including their interpretation of the authority
invested in them to implement and carry out its provisions, is
entitled to great weight, nevertheless 'Whatever the force of ad-
ministrative construction ... final responsibility for the inter-
pretation of the law rests with the courts.' "I'
Since 1932, the California courts have attempted to intepret and ap-
ply the law as found in various general relief statutes.78 In the course of
this jurisprudence, two distinct lines of cases have emerged. In the first
line of cases, "the early cases," the California courts explicitly deferred to
the county's judgment with respect to the administration of the general
relief program.79 The courts refused to challenge the county's various
interpretations of the general relief statutes.80 Courts read the statutes to
provide the counties with virtually unlimited discretion.8
In the second line of cases, "the modern cases," the California
courts announced that counties could exercise their discretion only
within fixed boundaries.82 Beginning in the early 1970's, the courts be-
gan to inquire whether the board of supervisors was exercising its discre-
tion consistently with the overall purposes of the general relief statutes.83
Where a county's regulation was inconsistent with the purposes of the
welfare statutes, the courts reasoned that the board had exceded the
boundaries of its discretion.84 In stark contrast to their predecessors, the
modern courts prohibited exclusionary rules that were not reasonably
necessary to effectuate the purposes of the general relief statutes.85 Mod-
ern courts, far from being deferential to a county's judgments, have re-
76. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177.
77. Mooney v. Pickett, 4 Cal. 3d 669, 681, 483 P.2d 1231, 1239, 94 Cal. Rptr. 279, 287
(1971) (quoting Whitcomb Hotel v. California Employment Comm'n, 24 Cal. 2d 753, 757, 151
P.2d 233, 235 (1944)).
78. Comment, supra note 57, at 35.
79. See, e.g., Patten v. County of San Diego, 106 Cal. App. 2d 467, 470, 235 P.2d 217, 219
(1951).
80. See, e.g., id.
81. See, e.g., id.
82. See, e.g., Mooney, 4 Cal. 3d at 679, 483 P.2d at 1237, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 285.
83. See, e.g., id.
84. See, e.g., Robbins v. Superior Court, 38 Cal. 3d 199, 211, 695 P.2d 695, 702-03, 211
Cal. Rptr. 398, 405-06 (1985).
85. See, e.g., Mooney, 4 Cal. 3d at 679, 483 P.2d at 1237, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 285.
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quired the county to demonstrate the adequacy of its assistance levels.8 6
In this way, the modem courts have made it their business to interpret
the meaning of the welfare statutes and to define the meaning of the right
to general relief.
Reference to both lines of cases is still common in modern prac-
tice.87 Counties seeking to defend their programs invariably refer to the
early cases for the proposition that the county has discretion to run its
general relief program.88 Counties argue that it is not the courts' busi-
ness to direct the counties how to conduct their general relief programs.8 9
Plaintiffs challenging a county's regulations cite the modern cases for the
proposition that a county cannot exercise its discretion in a manner in-
consistent with the welfare statutes. 90
An examination of these two lines of cases will demonstrate how the
two different roles of the California courts have affected the scope and
quality of the right to general relief. Understanding how the courts have
approached general relief cases in the past will help to guide the reason-
ing of the courts in the future.
Because the administration of every county program has two parts,
eligibility standards and assistance levels, the discussion of each line of
cases is subdivided accordingly. Part one of each section shall discuss
how the courts review county eligibility standards; part two will discuss
county assistance levels. The combination of eligibility standards and
assistance levels accounts for the overall administration of the general
relief program. How a county interprets its duty to relieve and support
the poor is reflected in its performance of these two functions. A
county's eligibility standards describe the scope of the general relief pro-
gram: who is considered needy and who is not; who deserves care and
who does not. The county's assistance levels reveal the quality of the
statutory right and reflect the county's commitment towards fulfilling the
statutory goals of decent care, self-sufficiency, self-respect and the reinte-
ggation of indigents back into working society. 9'
86. See, e.g., Boehm v. Superior Court, 178 Cal. App. 3d 494, 498-99, 223 Cal. Rptr. 716,
721-22 (1986) [hereinafter Boehm I1].
87. See, e.g., Mooney, 4 Cal. 3d at 680 n.13, 483 P.2d at 1238 n.13, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 286
n.13.
88. See, e.g., id.
89. See, e.g., Long v. City of San Francisco, 78 Cal. App. 3d 61, 67, 144 Cal. Rptr. 64, 68
(1978).
90. See, e.g., Plaintiff's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for
Preliminary Injunction at 25, Rensch v. County of Los Angeles (L.A. Super. Ct.) (No.
C595155) (1986) [hereinafter Renseh Memorandum].
91. For example, in Los Angeles County, adults over 18 who are ineligible for AFDC,
SSI/SSP or refugee assistance and have no income are eligible for general relief assistance. The
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A. The Early Cases
In the early cases, courts were loath to interfere with the administra-
tion of the general relief program. Several characteristics are common to
this line of court decisions. First, the courts believed that the general
relief statutes specifically allocated the responsibility of administering the
county's assistance programs to the board of supervisors of each
county.92 Second, without a showing that the board of supervisors acted
arbitrarily, capriciously or unreasonably, courts lacked the authority to
interfere in the board's administration of the general relief program.93
Third, the courts refused to scrutinize the counties' justifications for es-
tablishing its eligibility and assistance standards.94 As a result, the as-
sumptions underlying the county regulations were never revealed nor
subjected to judicial review. The courts uniformly upheld county regula-
tions. From 1951 to 1971, this line of reasoning went unchallenged.
1. Eligibility standards
The first significant case to consider the legal duties of a county
under the general relief statutes was Patten v. County of San Diego.95
Mr. Patten was a general relief recipient in San Diego County.96 He
failed to report that he had received money from his sister while receiv-
ing county aid.97 When this was discovered, his general relief was dis-
continued. 98 Mr. Patten then sought to be reinstated on general relief,
but was denied.99 Mr. Patten instituted mandate proceedings to compel
the county to reinstate him on general relief."o The Department of Pub-
lic Welfare in San Diego stipulated that at the time of trial Mr. Patten
was indigent.'' The court ordered that Mr. Patten be returned to the
general relief rolls."0 2 Two months after Mr. Patten was reinstated, he
county assistance level, as of May 1987, was calculated as follows: $150 for housing, $86 for
food and $11 for personal care and household upkeep. Blair Memorandum, supra note 59, at
3-4. Due to a settlement agreement reached in Blair v. County of Los Angeles, the assistance
level increased by $33 in July of 1987 and will increase by $33 in July of 1988.
92. See, e.g., Patten v. County of San Diego, 106 Cal. App. 2d 467, 470, 235 P.2d 217, 219
(1951).
93. See, e.g., id.
94. See, e.g., id.
95. 106 Cal. App. 2d 467, 235 P.2d 217.





101. Id. at 469, 218 P.2d at 219.
102. Id.
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filed for retroactive benefits covering the period of time during which he
was indigent and the legal dispute took place.' 03 The court of appeal
held that Mr. Patten was not entitled to such relief because the trial court
had not made findings as to the time span of his indigency, and there was
no evidence showing that the department arbitrarily or capriciously de-
nied Mr. Patten his relief."° The court stated:
The administration of county general relief given pursuant to
section 2500 of the Welfare and Institutions Code is vested in
the county boards of supervisors. The Welfare and Institutions
Code does not require that the county grant indigents any spe-
cific type of relief nor does it require the payment of any spe-
cific amount of money to indigents nor prescribe the time at
which payments are to be made. These are matters within the
discretion of the board of supervisors and the court has no au-
thority to interfere with the administrative determinations of a
board of supervisors with respect to the granting of county gen-
eral relief in the absence of a clear showing of fraud or arbitrary
or capricious conduct.1" 5
Another early case involving eligibility standards was Adkins v.
Leach.10 6 As a prerequisite to relief in Monterey County, the county
board of supervisors required each applicant to furnish a dwelling ad-
dress. 107 Plaintiffs filed a class action suit claiming that Monterey's resi-
dency requirement violated the county's duty to relieve and support all
indigent persons under Welfare and Institutions Code section 17000.10'
Plaintiffs demonstrated that in Monterey County landlords required ten-
ants to pay rent in advance before taking possession.0 9 Plaintiffs were all
indigent and could not afford to make advance payments." 10 "Thus Ad-
kins and his family were in a position of frustration where they could
obtain no relief until they had a county residence, and they could acquire
no county residence until they were furnished relief." ''  As a result,




105. Id. at 470, 235 P.2d at 219.
106. 17 Cal. App. 3d 771, 95 Cal. Rptr. 61 (1971).
107. Id. at 774, 778, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 62, 65.
108. Id. at 773-74, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 62.
109. Id. at 774, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 62.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. Plaintiffs also sought an order under section 17001 to require Monterey County's
Board of Supervisors to adopt "standards under which aid is to be given to (or withheld from)
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The court, relying on Patten,1 B held that the county's regulation
was "neither arbitrary nor capricious conduct.""' 4 The court said that
the residency requirement was reasonable because it might ensure that a
recipient did not collect relief and "then pass on, perhaps to repeat his
demand in another county."' 15 The court therefore upheld the county's
residency requirement as being within the county board of supervisors'
discretion.' 
1 6
The early courts held that absent capricious or arbitrary action, the
counties had exclusive authority to decide the type and amount of relief
and how frequently relief would be granted.' 17 No inquiry was made to
ensure county general relief programs were adequately meeting the needs
of the poor."' The courts reasoned that although counties had a
mandatory duty to relieve and support the poor, the counties had author-
ity to determine the form and amount of relief." 9
Exercising their discretion, counties failed to relieve and support
their indigent poor, like Mr. Patten or the Adkins family. The court in
Adkins recognized plaintiff's allegation that the Adkins family was
forced to live on the streets without food.'2 ' But the court found that the
county was justified in excluding the homeless poor from relief because it
was reasonable for the county to protect itself from fraudulant claims. 2 '
The court accepted the county's argument that homeless persons may be
more likely to "pass on" to other counties and collect relief than other
general relief recipients. 2 The court accepted the county's justification
the persons described in section 17000." Id. at 776-77, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 64. Six years after the
codes had been put into law, the board of supervisors had failed to adopt such standards. The
California legislature enacted sections 17000-17006 in 1965. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE
§§ 17000-17006 (West 1980). Adkins was decided in 1971. 17 Cal. App. 3d at 771, 95 Cal.
Rptr. at 61. Plaintiffs challenged the standards being used by the Monterey Welfare Depart-
ment as being in violation of the due process clause as they were not adopted by the board. Id.
at 775, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 63. The California court of appeal held that the board of supervisors
was required to promulgate standards of aid and care for the indigent. Id. The court in-
structed the board to adopt such standards. Id. at 776-77, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 64.
113. 106 Cal. App. 2d 467, 235 P.2d 217.
114. Adkins, 17 Cal. App. 3d at 779, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 66. It is important to note, however,
that although this case was decided in the early 1970's, it was decided without the guidance of
the supreme court's decision in Mooney v. Pickett, 4 Cal. 3d 669, 483 P.2d 1231, 94 Cal. Rptr.
279 (1971). This may explain the court's use of an analysis typical of the early cases.
115. Adkins, 17 Cal. App. 3d at 779, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 66.
116. Id.
117. See supra notes 92-191 and accompanying text.
118. See supra notes 92-191 and accompanying text.
119. See supra notes 92-191 and accompanying text.
120. Adkins, 17 Cal. App. 2d at 774, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 62.
121. Id. at 779, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 66.
122. Id.
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without factual support, scrutiny or questioning.
Patten,123 read together with Adkins, 24 may be cited for the propo-
sition that a county board of supervisors has broad discretion to deter-
mine eligibility for relief. The county need not relieve and support all its
indigents if it can justify exclusion. Moreover, the county is not required
to present a valid justification for its exclusionary regulation; it need only
present a justification. Thus, the early courts deferred to the judgments
of the counties with little or no scrutiny.
2. Assistance levels
Several decisions regarding assistance levels were also made during
the early line of cases. The first case was County of Los Angeles v. De-
partment of Social Welfare. 2 5 There, eleven persons challenged Los An-
geles County's practice of treating old age security or needy blind aid as
family income for purposes of computing the amount of county relief to
be paid to their indigent husbands or wives.12 6 By counting categorical
aid payments as family income, 27 the county proportionately decreased
the indigent spouse's general relief payment.
1 28
Plaintiffs argued that the county's practice in effect required the
aged or blind recipient to use part of his/her aid for the support of his/
her spouse. 2 9 The court held that "[t]he administration of county relief
to indigents, as distinguished from old age security and needy blind
assistance, is vested exclusively in the county supervisors who have dis-
cretion, without supervision by the state, to determine eligibility for, the
type and amount of, and conditions to be attached to indigent relief."''
The court ruled that the county could decrease the amount of aid to its
indigent recipients without explaining the reason for the decrease.' 3 ,
The court held that the county had the exclusive authority to determine
123. 106 Cal. App. 2d 467, 235 P.2d 217.
124. 17 Cal. App. 3d 771, 95 Cal. Rptr. 61.
125. 41 Cal. 2d 455, 260 P.2d 41 (1953).
126. Id. at 456, 260 P.2d at 42.
127. Categorical aid payments, such as old age security or needy blind aid, however, are
federal/state categorical programs and are not intended to be subject to the demands of the
county. Department of Social Welfare, 41 Cal. 2d at 458, 459, 260 P.2d at 43. The money
appropriated for the "maintenance and support of aged and blind persons must be used by the
counties exclusively for such purpose." 41 Cal. 2d at 458-59, 260 P.2d at 43.
128. Department of Social Welfare, 41 Cal. 2d at 456, 260 P.2d at 42.
129. Id. at 457, 260 P.2d at 43.
130. Id. at 458, 260 P.2d at 43 (citing Patten v. County of San Diego. 106 Cal. App. 2d 467,
470, 235 P.2d 217, 219 (1951)).
131. Id.
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the "necessity for and amount to be allowed as indigent relief .... 132
Twenty-one years later, a California court of appeal, in Berkeley v.
Alameda County Board of Supervisors,'33 considered a challenge to
Alameda County's housing grant. Alameda County regulation section
9-25.7 stated that "[u]nrelated recipients residing in a common house-
hold shall have their grant determined in the same manner as a family
group." '  The effect of this regulation was to reduce a general relief
recipient's assistance level because the recipient was living with other
persons. Plaintiffs argued that without a showing of reduced need on the
part of each unrelated general assistance recipient, Alameda's regulation
violated the recipient's due process, equal protection, and freedom of as-
sociation rights.13 5 Plaintiffs, for the first time, attempted to challenge a
county's regulation on constitutional, rather than statutory grounds.
136
The court in turn rendered a constitutional rather than statutory
analysis. 137
The court rejected the plaintiffs' due process argument. 138 Plaintiffs
argued that by reducing each unrelated recipient's assistance level for
housing, the county had presumed these recipients were sharing rental
expenses, and therefore had less "need."' 139 If such a presumption had
existed, the due process clause may well have been violated.' 4 However,
the court found that no such presumption existed.1
4 '
The court stated that the "[a]ppellant's attack really centers on the
county's discretion to set the amounts which it will pay indigents."' 42
Relying on Adkins, 14 3 the court held that the determination of assistance
levels was solely within the province and duty of the board of supervi-
132. Id.
133. 40 Cal. App. 3d 961, 115 Cal. Rptr. 540 (1974). Although decided in the mid-1970's,
the reasoning used in Berkeley tracks that of the early cases,
134. Id. at 967, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 544.
135. Id. at 968-75, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 544-49.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 965-71, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 542-46.
139. Id. at 968, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 544.
140. Id. at 969-70, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 545. The court acknowledged, however, that if the
recipient was allowed a hearing to show that there was no decrease in the amount of money
needed for shelter and utilities even though the size of the household increased, such a regula-
tion would only raise a rebuttable presumption. The court cited Owens v. Parham. 350 F.
Supp. 598 (N.D. Ga. 1972), for the proposition that a rebuttable presumption was constitu-
tionally permissible if the recipient was granted the opportunity of a hearing. Berkeley, 40 Cal.
App. 3d at 970, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 546.
141. Id. at 972, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 547.
142. Id. at 970, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 546.
143. 7 Cal. App. 3d 771, 95 Cal. Rptr. 61.
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sors.'" It followed, then, that the court could not interfere in the board
of supervisors' decision unless there was a showing of fraudulent, arbi-
trary or capricious conduct. 145 The county had no obligation to deter-
mine grant levels according to an individual recipient's needs.1
46
The court also rejected the plaintiffs' equal protection challenge. 1
47
Plaintiffs argued that Alameda's regulation "discriminates against the
class of recipients living with other recipients or non-recipients."'
148
Plaintiffs asserted that such a classification "impinge[d] on constitutional
guarantees and [was] subject to strict judicial review, and must be justi-
fied by compelling governmental interest."'
' 49
The court quickly attacked plaintiffs' assumption that either "funda-
mental interests" or "suspect classifications" were involved.' Relying
on the United States Supreme Court's decision in Dandridge v. Wil-
liams,"' the California court held that "in the area of economies and
social welfare, a state does not violate the equal protection clause if the
classification has some 'reasonable basis.' "152
The court found that Alameda County's regulation had a "reason-
able basis" for decreasing assistance levels to recipients living in a
group. 153 The county argued that there were "economies in group liv-
ing."' 54 The court stated that although this case dealt with the most
basic economic needs of the impoverished, as long as "the classification
has 'some reasonable basis,' it does not offend the Constitution simply
because the classification 'is not made with mathematical nicety or be-
cause in practice it results in some inequality.' "I"5 The court found the
county had a "'reasonable basis' for allowing increased sums for those
recipients living alone than for those living in a group... [because] there
are economies in group living."' 56
Lastly, the court rejected the plaintiffs' freedom of association chal-
144. Berkeley, 40 Cal. App. 3d at 970-71, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 546.
145. Id. at 971, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 546 (citing Adkins v. Leach, 17 Cal. App. 3d 771, 778-79,
95 Cal. Rptr. 61, 65. (1971)).
146. Id. at 968, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 544.
147. Id. at 971, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 546-47.
148. Id. at 971, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 546.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 971-72, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 546-47,
151. 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
152. Berkeley, 40 Cal. App. 3d at 972, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 547 (citing Dandridge v. Williams,
397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970)).
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. (quoting Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. at 471, 485 (1970)).
156. Id.
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lenge. I"7 Plaintiffs argued that the county's regulation forced them to
choose between "moving into unshared housing or foregoing their proper
general assistance grant."' 8 The California court of appeal ruled that
under a constitutional analysis, the county's action did not "attempt to
regulate or prohibit speech, assembly, sexual expression or even associa-
tion."'5 9 "The only stated purpose of [the county regulation] was an at-
tempt to preserve county funds."' 60 The court held that the plaintiffs'
desire to live together did not implicate any of the constitutional values
of speech, assembly or sexual expression.
These cases, Department of Social Welfare 161 and Berkeley, 162 read
together, stand for the proposition that a county can set assistance levels
independent of a person's needs. A county had no obligation to explain
its decreased payments or to justify as adequate the particular amount of
aid allocated. 163 In fact, the county only needed to show that there was
some reasonable basis to believe that a person had less need. 164 No proof
that a person actually had less need was necessary. 65 The early courts
declined to scrutinize a county's justifications for enacting a regulation,
and thus failed to ensure that its regulation furthered the purposes of the
welfare statutes. Therefore, under the early line of cases, a county had
no legal obligation to demonstrate that its relief payments adequately re-
lieved and supported the poor.
In the early cases, the role of the court was to ensure that the board
of supervisors acted, but not to ensure that the board of supervisors acted
in a manner consistent with the purposes of the general relief statutes.
Courts may have arrived at this standard of review as a result of their
belief that the board of supervisors was more capable of gauging the
needs of the poor. Deference to a county board of supervisors was also
supported by the belief that "officials [were] presumed to act in accord-
ance with the law."' 166 The court's reluctance to interfere with and define
the obligations of the board of supervisors under the statutes may have
been a result of the court's lack of experience or knowledge in setting
eligibility standards or assistance levels.
157. Id. at 973-74, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 547-48.
158. Id. at 973, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 547.
159. Id. at 974, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 548.
160. Id.
161. 41 Cal. 2d 455, 260 P.2d 41 (1953).
162. 40 Cal. App. 3d 961, 115 Cal. Rptr. 540 (1974).
163. See Department of Social Welfare, 41 Cal. 2d 455, 458, 260 P.2d 41, 43.
164. Berkeley, 40 Cal. App. 3d at 972, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 547.
165. Id. at 968, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 544.
166. Patten, 106 Cal. App. 2d at 470, 235 P.2d at 219.
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The danger of the court's early position, however, was that it al-
lowed the board of supervisors to administer its general relief program
based upon statutorily impermissible assumptions regarding the poor and
their right to welfare. Throughout the early cases, several assumptions
regarding an indigent's right to welfare repeatedly surfaced. The first
was the belief that certain poor were more deserving than others. Sec-
ond, counties assumed it was permissible to weigh their own fiscal
problems against the needs of the poor. Third, counties assumed that
assistance comparisons between neighboring counties were permissible.
In this way, counties reasoned that if their relief standards were above
average, the poor from other counties would be drawn to their county.
Relying on this "magnet theory," counties kept their rates lower than
their neighbors' rates. Fourth, because the poor and indigent have little
political influence, counties assumed they could treat the right to welfare
as a privilege, to be expanded and contracted as politically expedient.
Many of these assumptions were wedded to historical perceptions
regarding the poor. For example, the assumption that certain poor are
more deserving than others can be traced to the Elizabethan Poor Law of
1601.167 Vagabondage, begging and thievery were common in sixteenth
century England.' 68 The Henrican Poor Law of 1536, responding to
these conditions and hoping to end poverty, made each county responsi-
ble for its poor. 161 Seen as a part of a new social order, the poor laws
dealt harshly with those poor who were viewed as undeserving. 170 The
undeserving poor were the able-bodied beggers.' 71 Such persons were to
be brought to the marketplace and "there to be tyed to the end of a carte
naked and be beten with whyppes throughe out... tyll [their bodies] ...
be blody by reason of suche whypping."' 72 Sixty-five years later, the
Elizabethan Poor Law established three categories of dependent persons:
the children, the unworthy poor (able-bodied but unemployed) and the
worthy poor (the incapacitated or helpless).
173
Remnants of the distinctions between worthy and unworthy poor
can still be found in the regulations promulgated by certain California
counties. For example, in Mooney v. Pickett, 17 the County of San Ma-
teo's Regulation GA-08 denied non-emergency general assistance to em-
167. W. TRAT-NER, supra note 2, at 11.
168. Id. at 7.
169. Id. at 8-9.
170. Id. at 8.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 11.
174. 4 Cal. 3d 669, 483 P.2d 1231, 94 Cal. Rptr. 279 (1971).
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ployable single men.'75 At the time, thirteen other counties in California
also had similar "single man rules." 17 6 Such rules, in effect, punished
able-bodied males for not being employed without regard for the impossi-
bility of obtaining employment in a depressed labor market.1 77 The
board of supervisors assumed that such men "should" or "could" be em-
ployed.178 The counties attempted to justify their regulation and argued
that single employable males were "theoretically" employable and there-
fore should not be entitled to relief.
179
The Mooney court, in language indicative of the modern case ap-
proach, exposed the flaws of the county's assumptions. The court stated:
To the man who cannot obtain employment his theoretical em-
ployability is a barren resource; it is inedible; it provides neither
shelter nor any other necessity of life. Until he can get a job, he
does not differ in economic resources from the man whose un-
employment stems from more personal disabilities. 8
The California Supreme Court, exerting its power as the final interpreter
of the law, challenged and rejected San Mateo's assumption that disabled
unemployable men were deserving while employable unemployed men
were undeserving.' 8 '
A second assumption relied on by the counties was that their own
financial difficulties justified narrow eligibility standards or subminimal
assistance levels.' 82 In Mooney, San Mateo County argued that "the
county simply [could not] afford to extend General Assistance to em-
ployable persons .... "''83 In almost every case involving general relief,
counties have made an economic argument in an attempt to justify their
overly restrictive standards. The Mooney court's response is indicative of
the modern case law approach:
We are aware of the financial difficulties which attend present
welfare programs on local, state, and national levels. This
court, however, is not fitted to write a new welfare law for the
State of California, and while the Legislature addresses itself to
that task it remains our task to enforce the existing law.' 84
175. Id. at 671, 483 P.2d at 1232, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 280.
176. Id. at 675 n.4, 483 P.2d at 1234 n.4, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 282 n.4.
177. Id. at 681, 483 P.2d at 1239, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 287.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 679-80, 483 P.2d at 1238, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 286.
180. Id. at 680, 483 P.2d at 1238, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 286.
181. Id. at 679-80, 483 P.2d at 1238, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 286.
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Fifteen years later, a California court of appeal, responding to the same
argument made by Merced County, said: "[t]his court is not unmindful
of the fiscal restraint imposed by Proposition 13 and the consequent need
for strict control of all county expenditures. However, budgetary con-
straints cannot justify excluding from minimum subsistence grants to the
indigent allowance for each of the basic necessities of life . ... ",185
Third, counties assumed that because poor people have less political
influence, counties could narrowly define the scope and quality of the
right to general relief without suffering any political consequences. The
fact that poor people have historically gained benefits only when their
numbers swelled and their anger erupted tells of the political nature of
the right to welfare. For example, during the 1960's with the rise of the
civil rights movement, political pressure was exerted on both the federal
and state governments to ease the hardships of life in the ghettos. 1 86 The
riots in New York, Los Angeles, Detroit and Newark were testimonies of
the political malcontent of the poor.'87 When the "invisible poor" be-
came visible and organized, poverty became an issue to which politicians
had to respond. But as poverty seemingly receeded in the 1970's, so too
did the political dialogue. In Los Angeles, for example, the board of
supervisors failed to raise the general assistance grant level for the five
year period of 1981 to 1986.188 This can be attributed in part to the
board's impermissible assumption that because the poor lack political
power, their right to welfare was a privilege. And therefore welfare
funds could be reduced to increase the funds available for other more
politically volatile causes.
Members on the board of supervisors and heads of city governments
are also acutely aware of the dangers of becoming magnet cities for the
poor. In a memorandum to the Board of Supervisors of Los Angeles
County, Mr. Eddy Tanaka, Director of the Los Angeles County Depart-
ment of Social Services, stated that if Los Angeles County were to elimi-
nate its sixty day penalty it "may encourage migration of indigents into
our County."'18 9 As one commentator has pointed out:
When state and local officials determine the level of funding for
care for the homeless without federal participation, their fear of
becoming a magnet for the homeless predominates. Propo-
nents of improved programs for the homeless must contend
185. Boehm I1, 178 Cal. App. 3d 494, 503, 223 Cal. Rptr. 716, 722 (1986).
186. See W. TRATTNER, supra note 2, at 297.
187. Id. at 294.
188. See Blair Memorandum, supra note 59, at 3.
189. Memorandum from Eddy Tanaka to County Board of Supervisors (Sept. 5, 1986).
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with the insistence of opponents that a more comprehensive
shelter program will produce a never-ending stream of home-
less people and an ever-widening cycle of expenditures. For in-
stance, the mayor of New York City rejected a proposal to
develop permanent shelter facilities by claiming that homeless
people would "flock here," thereby making New York a "land-
lord of last resort."190
The magnet theory provides supervisors with an incentive to decrease
assistance levels to the lowest common denominator, equal to the levels
of surrounding counties.
The statutory framework of county general relief programs allows
the board of supervisors in each county to rely on these various assump-
tions in determining eligibility and assistance levels. There is no support
for these assumptions, however, in the authorizing language of the stat-
utes. Use of these assumptions by the board of supervisors not only un-
dermines the intent of the statute, but also defeats the animating
purposes of the general relief program. The deferential standard of re-
view applied in the early cases furthered the counties' reliance on these
assumptions. As long as the counties were able to pass judicial scrutiny
by justifying their programs based upon these assumptions, general relief
was treated more as a privilege than as a statutory right.
As the modem courts altered their standard of scrutiny, the role of
the court changed from that of a passive reviewer to an active enforcer of
the statutes. The decisions of the modem courts have, in effect, over-
ruled the reasoning used in the earlier line of cases. Reliance on the early
cases is still common, but as the next section will discuss, such reliance is
at best precarious and unjustified.
B. Modern Cases
In the landmark case of Mooney v. Pickett,'91 the California
Supreme Court announced that the board of supervisors in each county
could exercise its discretion only within fixed boundaries. 92 Since that
time, courts have struggled to determine the limits of those boundaries.
It is clear, however, that where those boundaries end, in large part, deter-
mines the scope and quality of the right to welfare.
In the course of litigation since Mooney, courts have analyzed cases
190. Note, Homelessness: Halting the Race to the Bottom, 3 YALE L. & PoL'y REV. 520,
525 (1985) (discussing letter to the editor from Mayor Edward I. Koch as reported in N.Y.
Times, June 23, 1984, at A22, col. 1).
191. 14 Cal. 3d 669, 483 P.2d 1231, 94 Cal. Rptr. 279 (1971).
192. Id. at 679, 483 P.2d at 1237, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 285.
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with two primary concerns in mind. First, the courts have scrutinized
whether the county's regulations were consistent with the overarching
purposes and objectives of the state welfare statutes. 93 Second, the
courts have inquired whether the county's assistance levels were based
upon minimum subsistence studies conducted in each county. 194 Where
a county's regulations failed to pass the court's scrutiny, the court invali-
dated the county's regulation stating that the county board of supervisors
had either failed to meet its mandatory duty under Welfare and Institu-
tions Code section 17000195 or that the board had overreached its discre-
tionary authority by adopting regulations which were inconsistent with
the statutes. 
196
With these two concerns in mind, modern courts have consistently
rejected four arguments made by counties. First, counties have tried to
convince courts that because they can "determine eligibility for, the type
and amount of, and conditions to be attached to indigent relief[,]" 197 they
should be considered autonomous bodies for purposes of the general re-
lief program. 198 Rejecting this position, modern courts have stated that
counties act as the state's agents, and as such must act in conformity with
and effectuate the purposes of the enabling statutes. 199 Second, courts
have rejected the counties' long standing argument that their budgetary
constraints may be considered in determining general relief standards.2"
Third, regulations attempting to include theoretical employment or hy-
pothetical resources, such as parental support, have been condemned as
contrary to the intent of the enabling statutes.20' Fourth, courts have
ruled that where a county makes an irrebuttable presumption that a cer-
tain class of people have no "need" for aid, such a regulation violates the
193. See, e.g., Boehm v. County of Merced, 163 Cal. App. 3d 447, 451-52, 209 Cal. Rptr.
530, 532 (1985) [hereinafter Boehm I].
194. See, e.g., id. at 452, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 532-33.
195. See, e.g., Bernhardt v. Board of Supervisors, 58 Cal. App. 3d 806, 810-11, 130 Cal.
Rptr. 189, 192 (1976).
196. See, e.g., Clay v. Tryk, 177 Cal. App. 3d 119, 124-27, 222 Cal. Rptr. 729, 731-33
(1986).
197. Mooney v. Pickett, 4 Cal. 3d 669, 678, 483 P.2d 1231, 1237, 94 Cal. Rptr. 279, 285
(1971) (quoting County of Los Angeles v. Department of Social Welfare, 41 Cal. 2d 455, 458,
260 P.2d 41, 43 (1953)).
198. Id.
199. See Robbins v. Superior Court, 38 Cal. 3d 199, 211-12, 695 P.2d 695, 702-03, 211 Cal,
Rptr. 398, 405-06 (1985); Mooney, 4 Cal. 3d at 679, 483 P.2d at 1237, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 285.
200. See Mooney, 4 Cal. 3d at 680, 483 P.2d at 1238, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 286; Boehm 11, 178
Cal. App. 3d 494, 503, 223 Cal. Rptr. 716, 722 (1986); Bernhardt, 58 Cal. App. 3d at 811,130
Cal. Rptr. at 192-93; City of San Francisco v. Superior Court, 57 Cal. App. 3d 44, 47, 128 Cal.
Rptr. 712, 714 (1976).
201. Mooney, 4 Cal. 3d at 679-80, 483 P.2d at 1238, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 286; Bernhardt, 58 Cal.
App. 3d at 812, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 193.
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intent of the statutes.2 °2 The modem courts have applied their reasoning
to both eligibility standards and assistance levels.
1. Eligibility standards
Three modem cases can be cited for the proposition that a county's
eligibility standards must comport with the overall goals of the general
relief statutes and must be reasonably necessary to effectuate those
goals.21 3  In Bernhardt v. Board of Supervisors,2°4  Alameda County
adopted regulations permitting aid to young adults, persons eighteen,
nineteen or twenty years of age, if they qualified under an "exceptional
circumstances" standard.20 5 The county reasoned that young adults
could and should return to their parents so their parents could "fulfill
their parental obligation.
20 6
The California court of appeal, applying a statutory analysis, struck
the county's regulation.20 7 The court held that "section 17000 imposes
upon respondent county a mandatory duty to support all indigent per-
sons lawfully resident therein, and ... that it cannot impose additional
standards of eligibility which are neither established nor authorized by
the Legislature. ' 20 8 The county argued that establishment of the regula-
tion was directly within the county's statutory discretion.20 9 However,
the court read the statute otherwise and found that the county had acted
beyond the scope of its discretion. 210 The county board of supervisors
acted outside the "fixed boundaries" of its discretionary authority by
adopting a regulation that was inconsistent with the purposes of section
17000.211
Nine years later, the California Supreme Court decided Robbins v.
Superior Court.212 In Robbins, twenty single, employable residents of
202. Clay, 177 Cal. App. 3d at 124, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 732.
203. See Robbins, 33 Cal. 3d 199, 695 P.2d 695, 211 Cal. Rptr. 398; Mooney, 4 Cal. 3d 669,
483 P.2d 1231, 94 Cal. Rptr. 279; Bernhardt, 58 Cal. App. 3d 806, 130 Cal. Rptr. 189.
204. 58 Cal. App. 3d 806, 130 Cal. Rptr. 189.
205. Id. at 808-09, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 190-91.
206. Id. at 812-13, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 193. ALAMEDA COUNTY, CAL., CODE art. 16,
§ 9-31.2 (1972).
207. Bernhardt, 58 Cal. App. 3d at 812-13, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 193.
208. Id. at 810, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 192 (emphasis in original).
209. Id.
210. Id. at 810-13, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 192-93.
211. Id. at 811-13, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 192-93. The court, quoting Mooney, stated that "the
ordinance and regulations leave the needy but unexceptional 'young adult' without 'any source
of relief whatsoever-a result inconsistent with the language and purpose of section 17000 and
other statutes establishing General Assistance relief.'" Id. at 812, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 193 (quot-
ing Mooney v. Pickett, 4 Cal. 3d 669, 681, 483 P.2d 1231, 1239, 94 Cal. Rptr. 279, 287 (1971)).
212. 38 Cal. 3d 199, 695 P.2d 695, 211 Cal. Rptr. 398.
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Sacramento County challenged a regulation requiring eligible single and
employable residents to accept "in-kind" benefits of food and shelter at a
county run facility instead of a cash grant.213 Applicants were therefore
given the choice of living in the county shelter or foregoing aid
altogether.214
Plaintiffs challenged the county's "in-kind" regulation on two
grounds. First, plaintiffs argued that the regulation failed to comply with
the purposes of general relief.215 Second, plaintiffs argued that such a
requirement violated their right to privacy under the California Constitu-
tion.21 6 The court found both arguments persuasive.217
The court compared the county's regulation to the statutory pur-
poses of Welfare and Institutions Code section 10000. Finding the
county's regulation inconsistent with the statute, the court said that the
county's regulation "does not 'humanely' promote 'self-reliance' or 'self-
respect' when it compels its impoverished residents to give up their living
quarters and control over their daily lives in exchange for residence in a
rigidly regulated facility. '218 The court noted that the county's policy of
giving the applicant the "option" to refuse to live at the county shelter
could "scarcely be characterized as 'humane.' "219 By exercising his/her
option, an applicant would become self-reliant, but destitute and home-
less. The court ruled that the policy violated the goals of the state's wel-
fare laws.220
The county, in turn, argued that "county supervisors have sole dis-
cretion to determine who is eligible for indigent relief, the type and
amount of relief to be received, and the conditions to be attached to such
relief. ' 221 Familiar with this argument, the court acknowledged that
each county has broad discretion, but reaffirmed that discretion could be
213. Id. at 203, 695 P.2d at 697, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 400.
214. The Bannon Street Emergency Shelter housed up to 67 men and women. Id. at 204,
695 P.2d at 697, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 400. The residents would sleep in dormitories with shared
toilet facilities. Id. The dormitories were open, with no private rooms, alcoves or dividing
walls. Id.
Residents were not allowed to enter the facility or the women's dormitory without staff
permission. Id. Thirty minute meal periods were scheduled three times a day, and alcoholic
beverages were prohibited. Id. Telephone use was limited to a payphone in the lobby. Id. A
"bed check" was conducted each night at nine o'clock p.m., and each resident was required to
be present. Id. No one was allowed to leave the facility after the bed check. Id.
215. Id. at 208, 695 P.2d at 700, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 403.
216. Id. at 212, 695 P.2d at 703, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 406.
217. Id. at 209, 213, 695 P.2d at 701, 704, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 404, 407.
218. Id. at 209, 695 P.2d at 701, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 404.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 211, 695 P.2d at 702, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 405.
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exercised only within certain fixed boundaries.2 22 Where the county is
acting in the capacity of a state agency, its regulations "must be consis-
tent, not in conflict with the statute, and reasonably necessary to effectu-
ate its purpose. '223 Where a county's regulations fail to adhere to the
purpose of the general relief program, the court must strike down the
regulations for the simple reason that the county has stepped beyond its
discretionary authority.
In several places, the supreme court emphatically stated that it is the
proper role and duty of the court to ensure that a county's regulations
comply with the statutory goals of the general relief program.2 24
"[C]ourts must enforce the counties' duty to 'encourage self-reliance' in a
'humane' manner consistent with modem standards." 225 The supreme
court also stated: "[w]e have no doubt that when statutes affecting the
well-being-perhaps the very survival-of citizens of this state are being
violated with impunity by the [county], an agent of the state, the courts,
as final interpreters of the law, must intervene to enforce compliance." '226
Finding that the courts have a duty to enforce welfare laws, the
supreme court asserted that such laws should be liberally interpreted and
actively enforced.227 Such a method of interpretation is due in part, the
court said, to the evolving nature of welfare laws. "'The evolution of
public welfare has been from public 'charity' towards social justice.
Courts should facilitate such development by an enlightened and liberal
interpretation of all welfare laws.' "228
Resolving its statutory analysis in favor of plaintiffs, the court next
turned to the plaintiffs' privacy claims. The supreme court found merit
in the plantiffs' argument that the county's regulations violated their
right to privacy under the California Constitution. 229 The right to pri-
vacy was held to encompass the right to choose the people with whom
one lives.2 30 The court reasoned that an "acute loss of personal privacy
222. Id. The court at this point stated that there "are clear-cut limits" to a county's discre-
tion. Id. Unfortunately those limits have failed to emerge as being clear-cut.
223. Id. at 211, 695 P.2d at 702, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 406.
224. Id. at 212, 695 P.2d at 703, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 406.
225. Id. at 210, 695 P.2d at 701, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 404-05.
226. Id. at 212, 695 P.2d at 703, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 406 (quoting City of San Francisco v.
Superior Court, 57 Cal. App. 3d 44, 50, 128 Cal. Rptr. 712, 716 (1976)).
227. Id. at 208, 695 P.2d at 700-01, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 404.
228. Id. at 209, 695 P.2d at 701, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 404 (quoting County of Los Angeles v.
Worker's Comp. Appeals Bd., 30 Cal. 3d 391, 401, 637 P.2d 681, 687, 179 Cal. Rptr. 214, 220
(1981)).
229. Id. at 213, 695 P.2d at 704, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 407.
230. Id. (citing City of Santa Barbara v. Adamson, 27 Cal. 3d 123, 130, 610 P.2d 436, 439,
164 Cal. Rptr. 539, 542 (1980)).
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is inevitable where residents sleep in dormitories, eat in a cafeteria, use
the same bathrooms, and live according to institutionally prescribed rules
of conduct."2 ' Finding the indigent's right to welfare was conditioned
upon a waiver of their constitutional right to privacy, the court required
that the government regulation be subjected to strict judicial scrutiny.232
The county was unable to show that "there [were] no available alterna-
tive means that could maintain the integrity of the benefits program with-
out severely restricting a constitutional right."
233
The county made four arguments in an attempt to justify its regula-
tion. These four arguments were: 1) persons who lived at the county
shelter were better cared for by the county; 2) persons who stayed at the
county shelter remained on general relief for shorter periods of time;
3) by requiring persons to live at the county shelter, there were fewer
chances of general relief fraud; and 4) by requiring persons to live at the
county shelter, the county saved money. The court rejected all four ar-
guments as insufficient.234 In response to one such argument, the court
stated, "[t]he denial of the fundamental right to privacy for impoverished
citizens is no less intolerable simply because they are poor. ' 235  The
court's response was sharply aimed at the county's assumption that be-
cause these people were poor they had less "need" or "right" to
privacy.
236
In Nelson v. Board of Supervisors,237 plaintiffs challenged San Diego
County's regulation which terminated general relief payments to persons
who were unable to obtain a "valid address" within sixty days of their
initial application. 38 San Diego's "valid address" requirement was simi-
lar in theory and practice to that of Monterey County's "residency re-
quirement" in Adkins v. Leach.239 Plaintiffs argued that San Diego's
"valid address" regulation effectively and impermissibly excluded home-
less people from relief.240 The court of appeal agreed with the plaintiffs,
231. Id.
232. Id. (quoting Bagley v. Washington Township Hosp. Dist., 65 Cal. 2d 499, 505, 421
P.2d 409, 414, 55 Cal. Rptr. 401, 406 (1966)).
233. Id.
234. Id. at 214-17, 695 P.2d at 704-07, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 408-10.
235. Id. at 215, 695 P.2d at 705, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 408.
236. Id.
237. 190 Cal. App. 3d 25, 235 Cal. Rptr. 305 (1987).
238. Id. at 27, 235 Cal. Rptr. at 306.
239. 17 Cal. App. 3d 771, 95 Cal. Rptr. 61 (1971).
240. Nelson, 190 Cal. App. 3d at 32, 235 Cal. Rptr. at 310. Plaintiff Nelson was a homeless
resident of San Diego County. Id. at 28, 235 Cal. Rptr. at 307. She had lived in San Diego for
33 years. Id. She applied for general relief in 1985 and received aid for only 60 days because
she could not provide a rent receipt. Id. Furthermore, because she could not locate housing
within sixty days of her application for relief, her relief was terminated. Id.
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and ordered the superior court to reverse its decision granting San Diego
County's demurrer on the initial complaint.24'
Reviewing the legality of the county's ordinance, the court set out a
two part test. First, the court examined whether the county's regulation
was consistent with the general relief statutes.242 Second, the court in-
quired whether the regulation was reasonably necessary to effectuate the
statutory purposes of general relief.243 The court found San Diego's ordi-
nance invalid under both prongs.2 4
The court examining the general relief statutes found no evidence
that a valid address was a prerequisite to proving residency. 24 5 "[T]he
statute does not exclude those indigent residents without addresses." '246
Reviewing prior case law, Government Code sections 243, 244 and Wel-
fare and Institutions Code section 17101, the Nelson court found resi-
dency to be a function of a person's presence and intent to remain in the
jurisdiction.247 The court, therefore, ruled that the ordinance was "in-
consistent with an [sic] in open conflict with section 17000's mandate to
relieve [and] support lawfully resident indigent persons.
248
The court also found that there was "nothing in [the] record to com-
pel a finding... [that] the challenged regulations further[ed] any govern-
mental interest necessary to effectuate the purposes of the general relief
statutes. '249 The court rejected the county's argument that the "valid
address" requirement was necesary to prevent fraudulent claims.2 ° The
court stated that preventing fraudulent claims was a legitimate county
interest, but cAutioned that "regulations may be invalid if they are more
restrictive than necessary and extend not only to claimants suspected of
fraud but also to nonsuspected claimants."'251 Nothing in the record es-
tablished that "as a matter of law homeless general relief recipients
[were] more likely than other general relief recipients to make fraudulent
benefit claims. '252 As a result, the court ruled that the challenged regu-
lations were not "necessary to prevent fraud.
'253
241. Id. at 35, 235 Cal. Rptr. at 312.
242. Id. at 29-31, 235 Cal. Rptr. at 308-09.
243. Id. at 31-32, 235 Cal. Rptr. at 309-10.
244. Id. at 29, 235 Cal. Rptr. at 307.
245. Id. at 31, 235 Cal. Rptr. at 309.
246. Id. at 30, 235 Cal. Rptr. at 309.
247. Id. at 30, 235 Cal. Rptr. at 308.
248. Id. at 31, 235 Cal. Rptr. at 309.
249. Id. at 31-32, 235 Cal. Rptr. at 309-10.
250. Id. at 31, 235 Cal. Rptr. at 309.
251. Id. at 32, 235 Cal. Rptr. at 309.
252. Id. at 32, 235 Cal. Rptr. at 310.
253. Id.
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The court flatly rejected the county's attempts to justify its regula-
tion on the grounds that housing was available in San Diego, and that the
regulation was cost effective. 4 The court stated that nothing in the rec-
ord indicated that finding housing was anything but "merely theoreti-
cal."' 255  The court quoting Bernhardt said a "county-established
exclusion, from eligibility for General Assistance relief, may not be justi-
fied by substantial public cost to be anticipated in its absence .... 256
The court thus focused on and rejected two of the justifications counties
had often relied upon in the early cases.
In a clear demonstration of the modern court's disapproval of the
reasoning used in the early cases, the Nelson court refused to follow Ad-
kins' precedent. The court stated that "whatever its validity in 1971,
latter case law has undermined Adkins. Adkins is not binding on this
court now. '' 217 The Nelson court attacked Adkins' failure to "analyze
whether Monterey County's address requirement was in fact necessary to
achieve its apparent purpose of assuring general [relief] applicants were
'truly' residents or to further any other legitimate governmental inter-
est." '258 The Nelson court not only rejected the reasoning applied in Ad-
kins, but also condemned the deferential treatment the early courts gave
to the counties. 9
As evidenced by these three cases, modern courts will subject a
counties' exclusionary regulations to a substantial or strict level of scru-
tiny requiring that they prove their regulations to be necessary to effectu-
ate the purposes of the general relief statutes. Modern courts have
refused to defer to the judgments of the counties and continue to require
them to substantiate their regulations. As a result of the stricter level of
scrutiny applied by modern courts in general relief cases, reliance upon
the reasoning used in the early cases is misplaced.
2. Assistance levels
The modern courts' reasoning has also completely altered the man-
ner in which counties are permitted to set assistance levels. The actual
assistance level which is paid each month to an indigent person has been
and continues to be the subject of vehement dispute between counties and
the courts. To a large extent how the courts interpret the meaning of the
254. Id.
255. Id. at 32, 235 Cal. Rptr. at 310.
256. Id. (quoting Bernhardt v. Board of Supervisors, 58 Cal. App. 3d 806, 811. 130 Cal.
Rptr. 189, 192 (1976)).
257. Id. at 33, 235 Cal. Rptr. at 310.
258. Id. at 34, 235 Cal. Rptr. at 311.
259. See id.
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terms "relieve" and "support" determines the amount of aid that must be
paid, and thus the quality of life the poor and the indigent will lead.
The first of the modem cases to discuss assistance levels was City of
San Francisco v. Superior Court.26° In City of San Francisco, plaintiffs
sought to compel the City and County of San Francisco to adopt stan-
dards of aid and care for its indigent and dependent poor.2 6 1 Plaintiffs
also argued that the benefits provided by the city and county were arbi-
trarily low and denied plaintiffs assistance levels sufficient to meet their
minimum needs.262
In this case, San Francisco had a flat grant system of aid. Men re-
ceived $83 per month, and women received $88.263 The board did not
employ any standard to arrive at these figures.264 The Department of
Social Services simply divided the amount that "the mayor and the board
of supervisors had deigned to appropriate" among the recipients.265
Plaintiffs presented evidence that for a person to survive in San Fran-
cisco, at a minimum subsistence level, $140 a month was necessary.
2 66
The superior court directed the Social Services Commission to con-
duct public hearings to determine the facts necessary to establish stan-
dards of aid and care.267 Their findings were to be submitted to the
court, and the court would determine the ultimate standards of aid and
care.
268
Reviewing the superior court's order, the court of appeal began by
conducting an analysis of the board of supervisors' statutory duty.
2 6 9
The court found that by not adopting standards upon which adequate
assistance levels could be determined, the City and County of San Fran-
cisco failed to meet its duty under sections 17000 and 17001 .270 The
court of appeal stated:
In the absence of any standards, we can only conclude that the
260. 57 Cal. App. 3d 44, 128 Cal. Rptr. 712.
261. Id. at 46, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 714. Even though Welfare and Institutions Code section
17001 imposed a mandatory duty upon the board to adopt standards, 11 years after its pas-
sage, the City and County of San Francisco had still failed to adopt any standards. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 48, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 715. General assistance grants in the surrounding counties
were: Marin - $195; Santa Clara - $148; San Mateo - $143; Alameda - $115; Contra Costa -
$113. Id. The fact that San Francisco's grant was significantly lower than its neighboring




267. Id. at 51, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 717.
268. Id. at 46, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 714.
269. Id. at 49, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 715-16.
270. Id. at 49, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 716.
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fixing of a level of aid so far below what is necessary to survive
to persons who have no other means by which to live is arbi-
trary and capricious and not consistent with the objects and
purposes of the law relating to public assistance programs set
forth in section 10000.271
The court of appeal upheld the superior court's order instructing the
Social Services Commission to determine the facts necessary to establish
assistance levels. 2  The court of appeal agreed that the court could "re-
view the appropriateness of the standards adopted by the Department of
Social Services., 273 The court of appeal also agreed with the lower court
that in order for the county to fulfill its legal duty to relieve and support
the poor, it must provide a level of care sufficient to meet the minimum
subsistence needs of the poor.274
The court of appeal, however, disagreed with the superior court's
order in certain respects. The court of appeal stated that the lower court
could not instruct the City and County of San Francisco to conduct pub-
lic hearings.275 In addition, the court of appeal further held that the su-
perior court would be encroaching upon the county's territory if it
attempted to determine the actual assistance level to be paid.276 The
court of appeal ruled that it was the proper role of the court to ensure
that the grant level adequately met the minimum subsistence needs of the
poor, but the court could not actually determine what the grant levels
could be.27 7 The court could review the methods used to arrive at the
figures, but could not actually select the figures itself.
2 78
271. Id.
272. Id. at 50, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 716-17.
273. Id. at 51, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 717.
274. Id. at 50, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 716-17.
275. Id. at 50, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 717.
276. Id.
277. Id. at 50-51, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 716-17.
278. Id. at 51, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 717. In Long v. City of San Francisco, the case following
City of San Francisco, the court went one step further. 78 Cal. App. 3d 61, 144 Cal. Rptr. 64
(1978). After reviewing the city and county's study, the court determined what the actual
standards could not be. Id. at 71-72, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 70. In this case, the board of supervi-
sors attempted to include the dollar value of food stamps in its monthly assistance levels. Id.
at 64, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 66. If the county included food stamps in its benefit package, the
amount of the package would have been $149 per month. Id. at 67, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 68. If
food stamps were not allowed, the amount would decrease to $107 per month. Id. The court
found that $107 per month was clearly unreasonable. Id. at 69, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 68. The
court implicitly declared that $107 per month was insufficient to relieve and support the poor.
Id.
Long was the first case to address whether welfare standards could be struck down solely
on the ground of inadequacy. Id. at 68, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 68. The court, interpreting the
legislative purpose behind the adoption of food stamps, concluded that the City and County of
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Almost ten years later, in Boehm v. County ofMerced (Boehm 1),279
the court of appeal again considered the adequacy of a county's grant
levels. In 1983, Merced County reduced its general assistance grant level
from $198 per month, a level which had not been increased since 1981, to
$175 per month."' 0 The Merced County Board of Supervisors made
such a reduction, however, without reviewing a factual survey delineat-
ing the minimum subsistence needs of Merced County's poor.28' The
board of supervisors simply delegated its responsibility to make the re-
quired determination and to recommend revised subsistence standards
based upon this determination to the Department of Human Re-
sources. 282 The department's written factual study of subsistence needs
was never submitted to the board. 83 The only information before the
board at the time it reduced benefits was a survey comparing the general
assistance standards of other San Joaquin Valley counties to that of
Merced County.284
The court held that by reducing assistance levels without having
seen the Department of Human Resources' study, the board failed to
meet its statutory duty. 85 The court reasoned that as there was nothing
before the board to establish a basis for its factual determinations, the
board's reduction of general assistance payments was arbitrary and capri-
cious.286 "The board could not have determined whether it was 'fat trim-
ming' or a 'chiseling of the indigents' bones' without having presented to
it a study of minimum subsistence needs of Merced County indigents.
2 87
San Francisco improperly included the value of food stamps in their calculations for general
relief grant levels. Id. at 72, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 70. The court then invalidated the county's
ordinance which included the food stamp payments as part of the benefit package. Id. The
court, having determined that the standards used to reach the figure of $107 per month were
impermissible, ruled that the city and county had failed to meet the statutory mandate to
relieve and support the poor. Id.
The court did not decide what the actual assistance level should be. Rather, the court
decided what the assistance level could not be. The assistance level could not be based upon
the impermissible inclusion of categorical food stamp benefits. Id. at 71, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 70.
But within the text of the decision, the court also indicated that if the county tried to allocate
an assistance level of $107 per month, the court would find that to be unreasonable and thus,
impermissible. Id. at 68-69, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 68.
279. 163 Cal. App. 3d 447, 209 Cal. Rptr. 530.
280. Id. at 449, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 531.
281. Id. at 450, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 531.
282. Id.
283. Id. at 452, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 533.
284. Id. By considering the general relief payments of other counties, the board of supervi-
sors undoubtedly tried to avoid being a magnet city.
285. Id. at 451-53, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 532-33.
286. Id. at 452-53, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 532-33.
287. Id. at 453, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 533.
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Following the court's order in Boehm 1, the county conducted two
studies of the minimum subsistence needs of its indigents.2 88 Each study,
however, only concerned the minimum subsistence needs for housing (in-
cluding utilities) and food.2 89 Initially, the county set the assistance level
at $175 per month,290 which was the same amount as the 1983 reduction
level.29 1 After the second study was completed, the county raised the
amount to $185.292 The indigent residents of Merced County again filed
suit against the board of supervisors claiming that because the county
only conducted studies regarding food and housing, the county failed to
relieve and support the minimum subsistence needs of the poor.293 In
Boehm 1I,294 plaintiffs asserted that by only conducting studies of food
and housing costs, the county had again acted arbitrarily and
capriciously.
295
The court, ruling in favor of the plaintiffs, stated that the counties:
[Miust set [general assistance] standards of aid and care that
provide benefits necessary for basic survival. In order to deter-
mine the level of [general assistance] to be paid, the County
must conduct a study of what is necessary for minimum subsis-
tence. Otherwise, we are left with a "standardless administra-
tion of general assistance [which] places the hungry and poor at
the administrator's whim and does little to foster the belief, so
important in a democratic society, that justice has been served
",296
The court then defined the term "minimum subsistence. '297 The
court stated that "minimum subsistence, at the very least, must include
allocations for housing, food, utilities, clothing, transportation and medi-
cal care."'298 By setting the floor of "minimum subsistence," the court




292. Id. This level was still $13 less than the pre-July 1983 level.
293. Id. at 497-98, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 718.
294. 178 Cal. App. 3d 494, 223 Cal. Rptr. 716.
295. Id. at 497, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 717.
296. Id. at 501, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 720 (quoting Baker Chaput v. Cammett, 406 F. Supp.
1134, 1139 (D.N.H. 1976)) (citations omitted).
297. Id. at 501, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 720.
298. Id. The court derived its definition of minimum subsistence from various court deci-
sions and several international treaties. Id. The court cited the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights. Id. at 502, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 721. "Everyone has the right to a standard of
living adequate for the health and well being of himself and of his family, including food,
clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security in
the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood
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prevented the board of supervisors from interpreting in their own way
the meaning of minimum subsistence. The court held that including al-
lowances for clothing, transportation, and medical care "'are essential
and necessary to 'encourage [self-respect and] self-reliance' . . . in a 'hu-
mane' manner consistent with modern standards.' "299
The Boehm II court ruled that because the county "[f]ixed the level
of [general assistance] without considering all of the necessities of life,"
the county acted arbitrarily and capriciously. 3" The court of appeal or-
dered the trial court to issue an injunction preventing the county from
reducing its general relief benefits below $198 and to award petitioners
retroactive benefits, prejudgment interest, attorneys fees and costs.
30 1
The court further ordered the county to initiate and complete, without
delay, a study of all the needs of its indigent residents and to provide
appropriate levels of relief based on that study. 30 2 Again, the court did
not actually determine what assistance levels would or should be;
30 3
rather, the court indicated that if a county's assistance level failed to con-
sider an indigent's full needs, the county had failed to meet its mandatory
duty.3°
As a result of the modern courts' statutory interpretation that to
relieve and support the poor means to alleviate the minimum subsistence
needs of the poor, counties can no longer set their general relief grant
levels without surveying the costs of living in their counties. In the
course of these cases, the courts have reinterpreted the counties' discre-
tionary authority. According to the California court of appeal, counties
may no longer provide relief in the amount, type and frequency of their
choice. Counties must now provide care which is adequate to relieve the
minimum subsistence needs of the poor. Furthermore, counties must
demonstrate to the court through minimum subsistence studies that their
assistance levels are adequate. The failure to base their assistance grants
on statistical studies renders a' county grant level arbitrary and
capricious.
Several modern appellate courts have recognized that since Mooney,
the standard of review applied in the early cases has been modified sub-
in circumstances beyond his control." Id. (quoting Universal Declaration of Hunlan Rights,
G.A. Res. 217A(111), U.N. Doe. A/810, art. 25(1) (1948)).
299. Id. at 502, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 722 (brackets in original) (citing Robbins v. Superior
Court, 38 Cal. 3d 199, 210, 695 P.2d 695, 702. 211 Cal. Rptr. 398, 404 (1985)).
300. Id. at 503, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 722.
301. Id. at 504, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 722.
302, Id.
303. Id.
304. Id. at 499-500, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 719.
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stantially.3 °5 A more accurate description of modern case law, however,
would be that the modem line of reasoning has overruled that of the
early cases. For example, the Nelson court explicitly stated that the anal-
ysis used in Adkins v. Leach 30 6 was improper and therefore declined to
follow it.3" 7 Due to a series of modem court of appeal decisions, nothing
is left of the early courts' trust in the counties' administrative or discre-
tionary authority. Courts no longer accept at face value the arguments
or justifications counties posit. Deference to the counties' judgments,
once the yardstick of the early cases, has been replaced by a standard of
factual scrutiny and circumspection.
Eligibility standards that at one time could exclude persons because
of theoretical resources or hypothetical criminal practices are no longer
permissible. Under the modem courts, all indigent persons are eligible
for relief unless the county can show that its exclusionary regulation is
reasonably necessary to effectuate the purposes of the welfare statutes.
Modern case law suggests that the courts will subject county regulations
to a substantial or strict level of scrutiny. Assistance levels which under
the early cases could be set according to the counties' needs, must under
the modem court be set according to the minimum subsistence needs of
the poor.
In the course of fifty years, California courts have played two dis-
tinct roles in the general relief program. In the early cases, the courts
played a passive role of deference and restraint. In the modem cases, the
courts have played an active role concerned with the counties' proper
implementation of the general relief statutes. As a result, the courts have
narrowed the discretionary authority of the counties and set a floor to the
meaning of general relief.
These two different roles have been manifested in two different ver-
sions of the right to general relief. During the early cases, the right to
general relief was a privilege more than a right. The scope and quality of
the right was left to the wide discretion of the counties. Counties could
choose to provide almost no care, or exclude persons based on residency
or employability. Modern courts, however, have fashioned this privilege
into an enforceable right. The modem courts have provided substantive
meaning to the terms "relieve" and "support." In so doing, the courts
have enunciated the counties' minimum legal duties.
How the right to general relief will fare over the next fifty years will,
305. See Nelson, 190 Cal. App. 3d 25, 235 Cal. Rptr. 305; Clay, 177 Cal. App. 3d 119, 222
Cal. Rptr. 729.
306. 17 Cal. App. 3d 771, 95 Cal. Rptr. 61.
307. 190 Cal. App. 3d at 34, 235 Cal. Rptr. at 310.
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in large part, depend upon whether the courts continue to play an active
role, or return to a passive role in California's general relief system. The
California Supreme Court has rarely considered general relief. Since
1972, the California Supreme Court has only addressed the issue
twice.3" 8 In both cases, the court has taken great steps towards encour-
aging an active court. How the present supreme court will deal with
questions of welfare policy and the general relief system is as yet un-
known.30 9 The next section will present an argument for the continued
active role of the court.
IV. THE CONTINUING ROLE OF THE COURT
To argue that the courts should continue to play an active role in the
California general relief system requires some definition. Use of the term
'"active" is not intended to mean that the court should attempt to estab-
lish eligibility standards or set assistance levels on its own. Instead, the
term "active" suggests that the court should continue to scrutinize
county regulations to ensure that they meet the overall purposes of the
general relief statutes.
Under this theory, the role of an active court is limited. The courts
should continue to require the counties to demonstrate that any exclu-
sionary regulation is reasonably necessary to promote the purposes of the
welfare statutes. Courts should also continue to actively review and
scrutinize county assistance levels to ensure they are in fact adequate to
meet the minimum subsistence needs of the poor. The greatest challenge
facing future courts therefore will not be the creation of new standards of
review or definitions. Rather, the most difficult task for the courts will be
to familiarize themselves with the operations of the general relief systems
in their counties to ensure the counties' claims are actually being carried
out and are consistent with the purposes of the statutes.
Understanding what the role of an active court will be does not
demonstrate, however, that an active court is preferable to a passive
court. Which role is preferable depends upon one's reading of the au-
thorizing statutes. If one reads the statutes to provide the board of su-
pervisors with the discretion to establish general relief programs in
308. See Robbins, 38 Cal. 3d 199, 695 P.2d 695, 211 Cal. Rptr. 398; Mooney, 4 Cal. 3d 669.
483 P.2d 1231, 94 Cal. Rptr. 279.
309. In 1987, the composition of the California Supreme Court changed. With the addition
of several conservative justices, the continued active role of the California courts in the general
relief program is uncertain. More conservative justices, concerned about the social costs of
greater general relief payments and the individual autonomy of the counties. may perceive the
proper role of the courts as being more deferential to the counties' judgments and less active in
its review.
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response to the needs of the county, then a passive court, like that of the
early cases, is preferable. If, however, one reads the statutes to require
the county to provide adequate care to all of its poor, then an active
court, which views the counties as agents of the state, is preferable. As
argued in part I, the latter reading of the statutes is preferable.
Three situations which continue to trouble the California general
relief system will help to demonstrate the role and responsibilities of an
active court. First, in reviewing cases involving eligibility standards, fu-
ture courts should scrutinize county regulations to ensure that they make
relief available both in theory and in practice to all indigent persons.
In Rensch v. County of Los Angeles, plaintiffs were a class of men-
tally disabled indigent and homeless residents of Los Angeles."' Plain-
tiffs sought injunctive relief to correct Los Angeles' allegedly burdensome
and exclusionary application process.31" ' Plaintiffs argued that because
the application process was arduous, they were effectively excluded from
relief and forced to live on the streets.312
According to the pleadings, roughly ninety percent of the women
and forty to sixty percent of the men on skid row are mentally dis-
abled.3 1 3 Studies indicate that over twenty-two percent of the mentally
ill homeless on skid row experienced previous psychiatric hospi-
talization.31 4
The eligibility dilemma for the plaintiffs was not their theoretical
eligibility, as they were all indigent and homeless, but was their practical
ability to complete the application procedures in order to qualify for re-
lief.315 Plaintiffs argued that the application procedures presented both
mental.and physical obstacles.31 6
For example, Mr. Rensch was required to meet with over thirty dif-
ferent people in nine locations.31 7 Mr. Rensch was not provided with
sufficient money or tokens for transportation or for telephone calls.
318
Mr. Rensch is mentally retarded.31 9
The application form was over eighteen pages long.320 The form
310. Rensch Memorandum, supra note 90, at 1.
311. Id.
312. Id.
313. Id. at 8.
314. Id. at 10.
315. Id. at 11.
316. Id. at 12.
317. Id.
318. Id.
319. Id. at 5.
320. Id. at 14.
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had complex instructions and difficult questions. 321 The pleadings indi-
cated that ten additional pages were often required after the initial forms
were completed. 322 The forms were all written at the twelfth grade read-
ing level.32 3 The generally accepted average reading level for consumers
and other public documents is at the sixth to seventh grade level.
324
Mr. Robert Chaffee, Director of the Department of Social Services
of Assistance Payments for the county, stated "[fight now, even a com-
petent homeless person has a rough time getting through a welfare appli-
cation process that was designed to be rough. It [was] designed, quite
frankly, to be exclusionary. "325 As a result of these obstacles, general
relief was but a theoretical possibility for the mentally ill homeless. The
irony of Rensch is that the mentally ill homeless are the very persons the
statutes were intended to aid.
Although the county settled out of court with the plaintiffs and
agreed to simplify its application process, the procedures are still burden-
some. A court reviewing such a case should apply the two part test set
out in Nelson v. Board of Supervisors.326 First, the court should inquire
whether the application process is consistent with the goals of the welfare
statutes.327 Next, the court should scrutinize whether the application
process is reasonably necessary to effectuate those goals.328 Another way
of framing the second inquiry is for the court to examine whether there
are any less restrictive application procedures which would not unrea-
sonably burden the county and would better serve the purposes of the
welfare statutes.
Second, future courts reviewing eligibility standards should care-
fully scrutinize regulations to ensure they are not predicated upon imper-
missible assumptions. For example, in Los Angeles County, general
relief applicants and recipients who are considered employable must per-
form certain initial and ongoing tasks to receive relief.3 29 In addition,





325. Speech by Robert Chaffee, Director of the Bureau of Assistance Payments, Depart-
ment of Public Social Services (Oct. 9, 1984).
326. 190 Cal. App. 3d 25, 235 Cal. Rptr. 305 (1987).
327. Id. at 31, 235 Cal. Rptr. at 309.
328. Id.
329. These requirements are: applicants/recipients must apply for unemployment insur-
ance benefits if it appears they are eligible; applicants/recipients must register for work with
the California Employment Development Department; applicants/recipients must conduct a
specified number of job searches each month.
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in workfare projects. These persons are required to "work off" their
assistance grants by working in various county departments. 3 ° Persons
who fail to meet these requirements are suspended from general relief for
sixty days.33' This is commonly known as the "sixty day penalty."
Such a regulation imposing a sixty day penalty should be subjected
to judicial scrutiny to ensure that it comports with the purposes of the
general relief statutes. Excluding persons who are already indigent from
relief for a period of sixty days is contrary to the express purposes of the
general relief statutes.332 Such a penalty ensures that an already needy
person becomes destitute and homeless. Adoption of such a penalty is
unsupported by the language or intent of the general relief statutes.
The sixty day penalty should be reviewed to ensure that it is reason-
ably necessary to effectuate the purposes of the welfare statutes. Courts
should carefully scrutinize the county's justifications, especially in situa-
tions where a county's exclusionary regulation will deprive persons of all
subsistence benefits. If the county's purpose is to ensure that persons
330. On the average, employable persons work eight, eight hour, work days a month in
order to "work off" the general relief grant. The expressed intention of the workfare program
is to "[keep] the indigent from idleness and [assist] in his or her rehabilitation and the preser-
vation of his or her self-respect." CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 17200 (West 1980 & Supp.
1987). In Los Angeles, the jobs that are commonly required of persons on workfare are to
"clean county beaches, mop hallways in county buildings and tend furnaces at the county
creniatorium, which disposes of the earthly remains of the county's poor." Blasi, If 'Decent
Provision for the Poor' is the Test, We Flunk, L.A. Times, Feb. 3, 1986, § II, at 5, col. 1.
Clearly the'jobs chosen for persons in workfare in Los Angeles County are inconsistent
with the purpose of the general relief statutes. Mr. Eddy Tanaka, Director of the Department
of Social Services, in a letter dated September 5, 1986, stated that the employment require-
ments are "designed to help the [general relief] client obtain full-time employment by requiring
him/her to apply for jobs, to gain work experience on the workfare project and/or to partici-
pate in job training." Letter from Eddy Tanaka to the Board of Supervisors (Sept. 5, 1986)
(discussing the 60 day penalty). The workfarejobs presently in use in Los Angeles County do
not seem to further Mr. Tanaka's goals nor do they provide indigents with the opportunity to
reintegrate into society.
331. A 60 day penalty will be imposed when a person does one of the following without
good cause: 1) is fired from or quits a job; 2) refuses or fails to accept a referral for a job or for
job training; 3) refuses or fails to meet work project requirements; 4) refuses or fails to meet job
search requirements; 5) refuses or fails to register or re-register with the E.D.D.: 6) is in a
penalty period for failure to perform employment related requirements in another county.
332. Although it is beyond the scope of this Article, argument could be made that a denial
of all assistance to indigent persons for 60 days violates the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment. The Supreme Court in two 1973 cases. United States Department of
Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973) and United States Department of Agriculture v.
Murry, 413 U.S. 508 (1973), struck down provisions of the Food Stamp Act which denied
certain persons eligibility to the program. For a further discussion see Good. Freedom From
Want: The Failure of the United States Courts to Protect Subsistence Rights. 6 HuM. Ris. Q.
335 (1984).
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fulfill their employable tasks,3 33 several less restrictive alternatives can be
found. Suggestions have been made that for every failure to appear, an
applicant's/recipient's check be reduced by a proportional dollar
amount. If the person misses all of his or her work, then no general relief
check would be issued, but no penalty period would be enforced. Or, for
every violation of a workfare requirement, the recipient could be required
to perform extra work. In addition, arguments have been made that a
penalty period of one to seven days is as great an incentive to comply as a
sixty day period. Imposing a longer time period than one to seven days
becomes punitive and not one intended to increase workfare per-
formance.
Courts should also be careful to examine the county's motive for
imposing a sixty day penalty. If the county's purpose for excluding per-
sons is to save county funds, then the penalty violates case law and is
inconsistent with the purposes of the general relief statutes. The purpose
for the sixty day period is clearly pecuniary. Mr. Eddy Tanaka, Director
of the Los Angeles County Department of Social Services, has continu-
ally justified a sixty day penalty because any modification of the penalty
would cost the county between $7,000,000 and $15,000,000 annually.
334
Such an underlying justification renders the sixty day penalty illegal.
Third, future courts will face challenges to the inadequacy of county
assistance levels. Courts should begin their analysis by considering
whether the board of supervisors has in fact conducted minimum subsis-
tence surveys as required by Boehm v. Superior Court.3 35 Next, the court
should determine if the board of supervisors in fact has reviewed these
studies before determining the appropriate assistance level. The difficult
issue confronting future courts, however, will be determining the accu-
racy required for a legitimate survey.
For example, in Blair v. Board of Supervisors,3 36 settled before trial,
a group of indigent residents of Los Angeles County claimed that the
county's housing costs survey was flawed because it failed to accurately
reflect housing costs in Los Angeles County.33 7 Plaintiffs argued that
any assistance level could not be based on that survey.3 38 Plaintiffs were
prepared to present expert testimony and statistical data which demon-
strated that the county's survey was inaccurate.339
333. See letter from Mr. Eddy Tanaka to the Board of Supervisors (Sept. 5, 1986).
334. See id.
335. 178 Cal. App. 3d 494, 223 Cal. Rptr. 716 (1986).
336. No. C568184 (L.A. Super. Ct.) (1987).
337. Blair Memorandum, supra note 59, at 2.
338. Id.
339. Id. at 1.
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The county responded to the plaintiffs' contentions in two ways.
First, the county alleged that its survey was accurate. 4 ° Second, the
county argued that even if the county's survey was flawed and the hous-
ing portion of the general relief grant too low, the county alone had au-
thority to decide which facts were pertinent to its general assistance grant
level.
341
Had this case gone to trial, the court should have recognized that an
inaccurate study, for purposes of establishing minimum subsistence
rights, is no study at all. If counties were permitted to base decisions on
inaccurately low studies, then counties would fail to meet their duty of
adequately caring for the poor.
The court should have also quickly dismissed the county's argument
that the county had sole authority to determine assistance levels. It is
settled law that the county cannot exercise its discretion to avoid its
mandatory duty or to undermine the purposes of the welfare statutes.342
Future courts should be willing to hear arguments on the accuracy
of county surveys. If the purpose of general relief is to provide for ade-
quate aid and care, then the courts must be willing to scrutinize and
analyze county data. Once plaintiffs have made a prima facie showing
that a county's survey is inaccurate, the county should bear the burden of
showing that its statistical analysis and methodology reasonably reflect
the minimum subsistence needs of the poor. If the court finds the statisti-
cal dialogue too detailed, then the court should not hesitate to refer the
case to a special master. Only through judicial scrutiny can the accuracy
of assistance levels, and thus county compliance with its mandatory duty,
be assured.
As these three examples demonstrate, an active judiciary can ensure
that the counties comply with their mandatory duties. Passive courts
would permit counties to circumvent the reach of the welfare statutes by
accepting the counties' theoretical and unsupported claims. As long as
the courts continue to play an active role in the California general relief
system, the poor and the indigent will have an opportunity to vindicate
their statutory rights.
V. CONCLUSION
In California, the scope and quality of the right to welfare largely
depends on which branch of the government has the authority to con-
340. Id.
341. Id. at 2-3.
342. See Robbins v. Superior Court. 38 Cal. 3d 199, 695 P.2d 695, 211 Cal. Rptr. 398
(1985); Mooney v. Pickett. 4 Cal. 3d 669, 483 P.2d 1231, 94 Cal. Rptr. 279 (1971).
January 1988] GENERAL RELIEF PROGRAM 541
strue the authorizing statutes. Unless the state legislature is willing to
enact a new statute, tension will remain between counties and courts.
The counties will continue to argue that they alone have the authority to
define the scope and quality of the right to general relief. In response, the
courts, acting as the final interpreters of the law, will require the counties
to comply with the goals and purposes of the general relief statutes.
At the heart of the general relief statutes is the desire for every Cali-
fornian to be free from suffering, destitution and homelessness. In con-
cert with this aspiration, courts should play an active role in the
functioning of the general relief system. Courts should not hesitate to
announce to the counties that in California a "fella" not only has the
statutory right to food, but also to shelter, utilities, clothing, transporta-
tion and medical care. Courts should not hesitate to remind the counties
that in California general assistance is predicated on the belief in social
justice rather than in public charity. In California general relief is an
enforceable right rather than a social privilege.
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